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Following	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Soviet	Union,	 the	 newly	 independent	 countries	 of	 Central	
Asia	undertook	reforms	of	their	agrarian	sectors	with	varying	degrees	of	speed	and	depth.		




institutional	 vacuum	 that	 presented	 an	 opportunity	 for	 the	 development	 of	 local-level	
management	 institutions.	 	However,	 the	historical	context	of	 the	region	poses	particular	
challenges	that	may	impede	users	to	capitalize	on	such	opportunities.			
		
Water	 User’s	 Associations	 or	 the	 local	 administration	 manage	 irrigation	 and	 drainage	
systems	at	the	local	 level.	 	Water	User	Associations	represent	international	donor-driven	
initiatives	 to	 introduce	 equitable,	 democratic	 and	 participative	 institutions	 for	 irrigation	






importance	 of	 irrigated	 water	 for	 local	 livelihoods	 in	 the	 research	 area;	 (2)	 to	 explore	
certain	 characteristics	 of	 the	 formal	 and	 informal	 institutions	 through	 which	 farmers	
manage	 irrigation	 and	 drainage	 systems;	 and	 (3)	 to	 depict	 ways	 in	 which	 “collective	
action”	in	irrigation	water	management	can	be	strengthened.	
	








centrale	ont	 entrepris,	 à	 différents	niveaux,	 des	 réformes	de	 leurs	 secteurs	 agraires.	Du	
point	de	 vue	de	 l'utilisation	de	 l'eau	d'irrigation,	 les	 réformes	 consistent	notamment	en	




et	 de	 drainage	 ont	 été	 abolies.	 Cela	 a	 créé	 un	 vide	 institutionnel	 et	 permis	 le	
développement	d’institutions	au	niveau	local	qui	puissent	être	participatives	et	appartenir	
aux	utilisateurs.	 Pourtant,	 le	 contexte	historique	et	 contemporain	de	 la	 région	pose	des	
défis	particuliers	pouvant	nuire	à	un	tel	développement.	 	
	
Les	 associations	 d'utilisateurs	 d'eau	 ou	 le	 gouvernement	 local	 gèrent	 l'irrigation	 et	 les	
systèmes	 de	 drainage	 au	 niveau	 local.	 Ces	 associations	 représentent	 souvent	 des	
initiatives	 conduites	 par	 les	 donateurs	 internationaux.	 Parallèlement,	 les	 institutions	
informelles	 et	 les	modes	 traditionnels	de	 coopération	qui	ont	 survécu	à	 l'ère	 soviétique	





changeant	 concernant	 les	 droits	 d’usage	 de	 l'eau	 et	 de	 la	 terre.	 L'étude	 cherche	 à	  (1)	
saisir	 l'importance	 de	 l'eau	 d’irrigation	 dans	 les	 moyens	 de	 subsistance	 des	 utilisateurs	
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Irrigation	 Management	 Transfer	 (“IMT”)	 is	 a	 broad	 concept	 that	 is	 used	 to	 define	 the	
process	 whereby	 the	 responsibility	 and	 authority	 for	 the	 on-farm	 management	 of	




Kyrgyzstan	 is	 among	 those	 countries.	 	 Since	 it	 gained	 its	 independence	 from	 the	 Soviet	
Union	 in	 1991,	 several	 far-reaching	 changes	 have	 occurred	 in	 the	 agricultural	 sector.		
Agriculture	 itself	 has	 changed	 from	 a	 revenue-generating	 sector	 to	 one	 of	 the	 survival	
strategies	of	each	rural	household.		The	agricultural	units	of	the	Soviet	era,	the	kolkhoz	and	
sovkhoz	 have	been	abolished	 and	 comprehensive	 land	 redistribution	 took	place,	 creating	
millions	of	 small	 landowners.	 	 The	 same	 irrigation	 system	 that	used	 to	 serve	 the	kolkhoz	
and	 sovkhoz	 of	 various	 sizes	 now	delivers	water	 to	millions	of	 small	 landholders.	 	While,	
during	 the	 Soviet	 administration,	 cotton	 was	 the	 main	 crop,	 today	 farmers	 are	 free	 to	
decide	 what	 crops	 they	 grow.	 	 All	 these	 factors	 challenge	 irrigation	 water	 use	 and	
management.		
	
In	 Kyrgyzstan,	 much	 like	 in	 other	 countries	 that	 implemented	 IMT,	 it	 is	 promoted	 and	
supported	 by	 donors	 as	 a	 way	 to	 open	 new	 frontiers	 for	 millions	 of	 new	 independent	
landholders	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 management	 of	 their	 own	 irrigation	 systems:	 an	 idea	
inspired	by	 the	 images	of	 long-enduring	 traditional	 self-governed	 irrigation	systems.	 	 IMT	
also	 means	 that	 irrigation	 departments	 would	 no	 longer	 have	 to	 shoulder	 the	 costs	
associated	with	 the	operation	and	maintenance	 (“O&M”)	of	 secondary	and	 tertiary	 canal	
systems.		Rather,	farmers	would	pay	those	costs	in	the	form	of	water	fees.		
	
It	 has	 been	 well	 established	 that	 the	 management	 of	 such	 common-pool	 resources	 as	
irrigation	water	 requires	collective	action.	 	However,	developing	 institutions	 for	collective	
action	 faces	 various	 challenges.	 	 Some	of	 these	 challenges	 are	 particular	 to	 Central	 Asia,	
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including	 Kyrgyzstan.	 	 First,	 throughout	 the	 20th	 century,	 Central	 Asia	 has	 mainly	






(“WUAs”)	 are	 expected	 to	 collaborate	with	 each	other	 and	with	 government	 agencies	 to	
collectively	manage	 system	maintenance,	 ensure	 effective,	 fair	 and	 timely	 distribution	of	
water	 between	 farms,	 collect	 payments	 and	 settle	 small	 disputes	 (The	 Law	 Library	 of	
Congress	2015).		
	
An	 equally	 significant	 challenge	 is	 developing	 the	 managerial	 capacities	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	
government	to	co-manage	irrigation	water	with	the	WUAs.	 	Functions	and	responsibilities	
are	 divided	 between	 government	 line	 departments,	 local	 government	 agencies	 and	 the	
users	 themselves	 grouped	 in	 WUAs.	 	 Sustainable	 management	 of	 the	 irrigation	 system	
depends	as	much	on	 the	user-agency	 relationship	as	 it	depends	on	 the	status	of	physical	
infrastructure.	 	 Currently,	 the	 government	 does	 not	 have	 the	 financial	 and	 institutional	
capacity	to	wholly	manage	or	co-manage	the	irrigation	schemes	on	its	territory.		It	is	unable	
to	collect	all	 irrigation	fees	and	there	tend	to	be	deferred	maintenance	of	the	system	due	
to	a	 lack	of	 funds.	 	An	added	challenge	 for	 the	agencies	 is	 to	manage	the	politics	around	
sharing	 irrigation	water:	while	previously	water	was	supplied	via	a	regional	canal	network	





changes	 that	 have	 occurred	 since	 independence	 inspired	 the	 present	 inquiry	 into	
contemporary	 irrigation	 water	 management	 in	 the	 Ferghana	 Valley	 in	 Kyrgyzstan.	 	 This	
thesis	explores,	through	a	case	study,	collective	action	in	institutions	of	local-level	irrigation	
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management	 in	 the	upper	Syr	Darya	River	basin.	 	 It	 sets	out	 to	provide	an	answer	 to	 the	
following	research	question:		
What	role	does	collective	action	play	in	the	initiation	and	the	practicing	of	local-





What	 kind	 of	water	management	 institutions	 (formal	 and	 informal)	 do	 current	
land	and	water	rights	generate	at	the	local	scale?		
	
The	 fieldwork	 took	place	 in	 two	communities	 in	 the	Kyrgyz	Ferghana	Valley,	 in	 the	upper	
Syr	 Darya	 River	 basin,	 over	 three	months,	 in	 the	 Summer	 of	 2008.	 	 The	 location	 of	 the	
research	 is	 described	 in	 greater	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 3	 under	 Section	 3.2	 and	 is	 shown	 on	
Figure	1.		
	
The	Kyrgyz	Ferghana	Valley	was	chosen	as	 the	 location	of	 the	research	due	to	 its	historic	
and	 contemporary	 importance	 as	 the	 breadbasket	 of	 Central	 Asia,	 and	 to	 the	 natural	
resource	management	issues	that	inflict	the	region	due	to	the	scarcity	of	arable	land	and	to	
the	density	of	the	population.		The	Ferghana	Valley	has	a	semi-arid	climate	and	agriculture	




in	 the	 Ferghana	Valley	 -	 Kyrgyzstan,	 Tajikistan	 and	Uzbekistan	 -	 devolution	was	 the	most	
advanced	 in	 the	 Kyrgyz	 Ferghana.	 	 Here,	 the	 agricultural	 and	 land	 reforms	 designed	 to	
boost	output	and	diversify	agricultural	production	necessitated	various	new	 legal	 regimes	
and	 implementing	 institutions	 for	 accessing	 land	 and	 regulating	water	management	 at	 a	










Chapter	 2	 introduces	 IMT	 and	 defines	 the	 principle	 concepts	 in	 this	 research:	 rights,	
institutions	and	collective	action.		Based	on	the	available	academic	literature,	this	chapter	
explores	the	linkages	between	these	concepts.		It	then	elaborates	on	the	various	forms	that	
collective	 action	 can	 take	 in	 natural	 resource	 management,	 including	 its	 linkages	 with	
agricultural	land-	and	irrigation	water-use	and	livelihoods.		
Chapter	 3	 describes	 the	 methodology	 of	 the	 research	 project	 from	 the	 design	 stage	
through	the	fieldwork	to	the	analysis.		A	reflection	on	the	various	aspects	of	the	fieldwork	is	








independence	 transformations,	 specifically	 in	 irrigation	water	management,	are	explored.		
Based	on	 the	 findings	of	 the	 fieldwork,	 formal	and	 informal	organizations	are	 introduced	












From	 the	 second	part	of	 the	20th	 century,	 governments,	 international	 organisations	 and	
NGOs	 have	 increasingly	 promoted	 the	 transfer	 of	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	 for	 the	
management	of	such	common-pool	resources,	also	called	the	commons,	such	as	irrigation	
water,	 forestry,	 fisheries,	 wildlife	 and	 rangelands,	 to	 lower	 levels	 of	 government	 or	
directly	to	the	users.		Developed	countries	implemented	many	such	policies	from	the	1950	
to	the	1970s,	and	developing	countries	followed	suit	in	the	1980s	and	1990’s	(Fujita	et	al.	
no	 date).	 	 In	 irrigation	 water	 management,	 devolution,	 also	 called	 IMT,	 reduced,	 and	
sometimes	eliminated,	the	role	of	government	institutions	in	operation	and	maintenance	
(“O&M),	 the	collection	of	water	duties,	 the	distribution	of	water	and	conflict	 resolution,	
and	delegated	 those	 roles	 to	 local-level	organisations,	 such	as	water	users’	or	 irrigators’	
associations	(Ghate	et	al.	2008).			
	
Decentralization	 and	 devolution	 are	 but	 the	 latest	 in	 a	 series	 of	 shifts	 that	 have	
characterized	water	resources	management	throughout	the	world	in	general	and	in	Central	
Asia	in	particular	(Allan	2006).		In	Central	Asia,	as	elsewhere	in	semi-arid	regions,	the	pre-
industrial	 era	was	 characterized	 by	 decentralized	 and	 small-scale	 irrigated	 cultivation	 for	
subsistence.		The	shift	to	a	“hydraulic	mission”,	began	in	the	1930s	with	the	collectivisation	
of	lands	and	the	development	of	large-scale	irrigation	systems	by	the	Soviets	in	an	attempt	
to	 turn	 the	 desert	 into	 a	 cotton-growing	 region.	 	 As	 a	 result	 of	 Gorbachev’s	 policy	 of	
perestroika	 that	 made	 the	 development	 of	 civil	 society	 and	 a	 preoccupation	 with	
environmental	issues	(such	as	the	drying	up	of	the	Aral	Sea),	possible,	the	hydraulic	mission	
was	replaced	by	a	policy	that	was	more	concerned	about	environmental	sustainability.		The	
objective	of	development	at	 this	 time	was	to	 improve	economic	performance	and	newly-
independent	 governments	 began	 sectoral	 reforms,	 including	 land	 privatisation	 and	 the	
introduction	 of	 water	 duties.	 	 The	 latest	 step	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	 policies	 in	 irrigation	
	 6	
management	is	the	promotion	by	international	development	agencies	of	Integrated	Water	
Resource	 Management	 (“IWRM”),	 IMT	 and	 Participatory	 Irrigation	 Management	 (“PIM”)	
(Abdullaev	et	al.	2008).		
	
Devolution	 and	decentralisation	policies,	 such	 as	 IMT	and	PIM,	 represent	 a	 great	 change	
from	 earlier	 policy	 that	 considered	 local	 communities	 obstacles	 to	 efficient	 resource	
management.		That	stand	is	perhaps	best	exemplified	by	the	policies	that	were	introduced	
as	a	result	of	Hardin’s	“The	Tragedy	of	the	Commons”.		In	his	article,	Hardin	explains	how	
“ancient”	 ethics	 by	 which	 people	 traditionally	 showed	 restraint	 in	 using	 their	 natural	
resources	 are	 poorly	 suited	 for	 governing	 the	 commons	 in	 a	 “complex,	 crowded,	











of	collective	action	and,	 in	 fact,	he	demonstrated	the	 failure	of	open	access	 resource	use	
rather	 than	 that	 of	 the	 “commons”	 (Theesfeld	 2004).	 	 Appell	 (1993)	 also	 argues	 that	
Hardin,	 in	his	work	on	the	“commons”,	did	not	take	 into	account	the	“emergent	and	self-
regulating	nature	of	social	organizations”.		In	fact,	people	are	social	beings	and	are	capable	
of	 cooperation	 and	 solidarity.	 	 Another	 critique	 is	 that	 Hardin,	 in	 his	 theory,	 does	 not	
inquire	 into	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 social	 entity	 that	 hold	 rights	 to	 the	 resource,	 about	 the	
nature	 of	 that	 entity	 and	 the	 rights	 and	 powers	 it	 has	 over	 the	 resource.	 	 According	 to	
Appell	 (1993)	 “the	 argument	 of	 Hardin’s	 critics,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 political	 philosophers	
interested	in	distributive	justice,	are	faulty	in	one	key	aspect,	which	they	share	with	Hardin.		
They	 fail	 to	 consider	 two	 basic	 problems:	 the	 locus	 of	 property	 rights,	 i.e.,	 who	 are	 the	
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holders	 of	 the	 rights,	 and	 who,	 on	 the	 system	 of	 property	 relations,	 are	 responsible	 for	
managing	the	rights”	(p.	9).	
	
In	 her	 work	 on	 common	 pool	 resources,	 Ostrom	 (1990)	 has	 also	 demonstrated	 that	








At	 the	 same	 time,	 another	 paradigm	 that	 championed	 the	 role	 of	 user	 communities	 in	
resources	management	emerged.		Supporters	of	communities	as	resource	managers	argue	
that	 users	 of	 a	 resource,	 given	 that	 they	 are	 empowered	 as	 a	 group	 to	 take	 over	
management	 of	 the	 resource,	 have	 the	 incentive	 to	 manage	 it	 more	 efficiently	 and	
sustainably	than	does	the	government.		It	is	suggested	that	the	capacity	of	a	community	or	
group	 of	 users	 to	 manage	 a	 resource	 in	 a	 sustainable	 manner	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 its	
intimate	 knowledge	 of	 the	 resource.	 	 Additionally,	 the	 fact	 that	 members’	 livelihoods	
depend	on	the	resource	will	provide	a	strong	incentive	to	maintain	the	resource	over	time	
(Meinzen-Dick	 and	 Knox	 1999).	 	 These	 ideas	 emerged	 from	 various	 scholarly	 studies	 of	






use	 of	 the	 common	 pool	 resources	 (Table	 1).	 	 The	 six	 main	 categories	 are	 (i)	 resource	
characteristics;	 (ii)	 group	 characteristics;	 (iii)	 institutional	 arrangements;	 (iv)	 external	
environment;	 (v)	 relationship	 between	 resource	 and	 group	 characteristics	 and	 (vi)	




common	 pool	 resource	management	 regimes.	 	Mukherji	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 note	 that	 a	 large	
number	of	 factors	 influence	common-pool	 resource	management	and	 that	 these	 factors	














































IMT	 came	 about	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 desire	 by	 governments	 and	 donors	 to	make	 irrigated	
agriculture,	an	enormous	user	of	freshwater	resources,	more	efficient.		Its	appearance	was	





environmental	 sustainability	 and	efficient	use.	 	 It	was	assumed	 that	 increased	ownership	
and	 responsibility	 for	 the	 resource	 by	 users	 and	 increased	 involvement	 and	 decision-
making	powers	 for	 them	would	 create	a	 commitment	 to	use	 the	 resource	efficiently	and	
sustainably.	 	The	fact	that	users	themselves	pay	for	the	cost	of	O&M	would	 increase	that	




IMT	 is	 not	without	 its	 critics.	 	 Hunt	 (1989)	was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 to	 point	 out	 its	 faults	 by	
drawing	an	analogy	between	the	capacity	of	users	of	modern	irrigation	systems	to	manage	
those	systems	with	managers	of	 traditional	 systems.	 	He	argues	 that	 traditional	 irrigation	




Moreover,	 community	 cohesion	 cannot	 be	 taken	 for	 granted.	 	 The	 power	 relations	
between	 different	 groups	 of	 people	 in	 society	 is	 expressed	 in	 many	 ways,	 for	 example	
gender	relations	(what	behaviour	is	acceptable	for	men	and	women),	age	(how	the	old	and	
young	 are	 regarded	 and	 treated),	 class	 (how	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 status	 of	 different	
groups	 is	 generally	 understood)	 or	 caste	 (the	 various	 restrictions	 surrounding	 caste	 that	
influence	 what	 people	 of	 different	 caste	 groups	 can	 and	 cannot	 do	 to	 change	 their	
livelihoods)	 (Messer	 and	 Townsley	 2003).	 	 The	 powers	 that	 are	 gained	 through	 the	
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decentralization	process,	which,	in	this	case,	are	the	rights	to	manage	Irrigation	&	Drainage	
(“I&D”)	 systems	 through	 local	 institutions,	 are	 negotiated	 in	 a	 social	 environment	 that	 is	
crosscut	by	those	“multiple	axes	of	differentiation”	(Agrawal	and	Gibson	1999).		Differences	
in	social	status	may	create	conflicting	powers	and	values	in	the	way	in	which	people	think	
about	 the	 management	 of	 resources,	 and	 these	 values	 will	 strongly	 influence	 users’	
incentives	 and	 opportunities	 to	 participate	 effectively	 in	 decision-making	 (Cleaver	 and	
Franks	2005).	
	
Questions	 regarding	 the	 supposed	 objectives	 and	 beneficiaries	 of	 IMT	 also	 arise.	 	 In	 the	
midst	 of	 the	 general	 enthusiasm	 for	 the	 democratisation	 (participatory	 management)	
aspects	 of	 IMT,	 few	 studies	 inquire	 into	 the	 politics	 behind	 management	 transfer.		
Suhardiman	(2008)	points	out	that	the	first	IMT	policy	formulation	originated	from	a	desire	
by	international	donors	and	governments	to	reduce	public	spending	on	irrigation	systems.		
With	 IMT,	 donors	 (who	 are	 frequently	 behind	 IMT/PIM),	 and	 governments,	 wished	 to	
achieve	 financial	 autonomy	 of	 irrigation	 systems	 through	 the	 recovery	 of	 operation	 and	
maintenance	 costs	 from	 users	 and	 by	 users’	 organisations.	 	 Thus	 IMT	 was	 first	 and	
foremost	an	economic	policy	that	aims	at	privatising	public	irrigation	systems.		It	was	only	
later,	in	the	1990s,	and	only	then	as	an	afterthought,	that	IMT	policy	was	linked	with	ideas	





choice	 in	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 accept	 the	 responsibilities	 and	 the	 authority	 for	 the	
management	of	 the	 system.	 	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 frequently	assumed	 that	 farmers	are	 ready	and	
willing	 to	 take	 over	 water	 management.	 	 After	 all,	 who	 would	 refuse	 such	 powers?		
However,	 the	 capacity	 to	manage	 is	 rarely	 as	 simple	 as	 forming	WUAs	and	handing	over	
management	responsibilities	to	them.		After	handover,	farmer	organisations	must	manage	
the	 physical,	 technical	 and	 social	 aspects	 of	 the	 system,	 tasks	 that	 require	 specialized	
knowledge.	 	Users	must	develop	certain	capacities	 to	manage	complex	 irrigation	systems	
because	there	 is	no	evidence	that	 they,	 just	by	being	users,	possess	 the	same	knowledge	
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about	 their	 system	 as	 users	 of	 small-scale	 traditional	 systems	 (Suhardiman	 2008).	 	 A	
pointer	 to	 this	potential	 lack	of	capacity	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	modern	 irrigation	systems	of	
the	1960s	and	1970s	were	designed	without	user	participation	and	contribution.		
	
The	 issue	 of	 user	 participation	 suggests	 that	 a	 concept	 that	 is	 commonly	 termed	 PIM	
should	 be	 considered.	 	 PIM	 is	 a	 process	 whereby	 users	 become	 participants	 in	 the	






The	 management	 organisation	 that	 is	 created	 during	 the	 IMT	 process	 and	 to	 which	
responsibilities	for	the	management	of	irrigation	system	are	transferred	is,	by	its	nature,	a	
participative	 organisation.	 	 Users	 choose	 their	 representatives	 whose	 duty	 becomes	 to	








Asian	 context,	 farmers	 are	 expected	 to	 contribute	 directly	 to	 irrigation	management.	 	 In	
this	 context	 of	 Central	 Asia,	 participation	 through	 collective	 action	 is	 desirable	 because	
farmers	are	unable	to	pay	high	fees	for	contractors	and	are	more	likely	to	invest	their	own	
time	and	energy	in	monitoring	and	maintenance	work.		In	this	thesis	the	view	is	that	farmer	




This	 section	 has	 provided	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 complexities	 of	 IMT	 and	 the	 various	







different	 levels	of	management	 in	a	 resource	management	system,	down	to	 the	 farmers’	





as	 groups	 and	 organisations	 that	 “influence	 who	 has	 access	 to	 and	 control	 over	 what	
resources	 and	 arbitrate	 contested	 resource	 claims”	 (p.	 226).	 	 Formal	 or	 bureaucratic	
institutions	exemplify	how	the	system	ought	 to	work	and	partly	determine	 the	strategies	
that	 households	 employ	 to	make	 use	 of	 the	 resources	 that	 are	 accessible	 to	 them.	 	 For	
example,	 policies	 for	 giving	more	 responsibility	 to	 village-level	 institutions	may	 give	 local	
people	more	influence	over	the	decisions	that	affect	them	directly.		Formal	institutions	are	
“visible”	in	the	sense	that	they	have	formal	and	clearly	defined	rules,	while	informal	ones	
tend	 to	 be	 “opaque”	 and	 therefore	 harder	 to	 recognize.	 	 Contrary	 to	 formal	 or	 “visible”	
institutions	that	are	often	imposed	from	outside,	“invisible”	or	informal	institutions	tend	to	
emerge	 from	 long-standing	 practices	 by	 members	 of	 societies	 and	 are	 embedded	 in	 a	












(p.	 237).	 	 Organisations	 exist	 because	 of	 a	 set	 of	 formal	 rules	 give	 them	 meaning.		
Institutions	may	or	may	not	have	organisational	manifestations	(Leach	et	al.	1999).		When	
they	 do,	 these	 provide	 arenas	 within	 which	 people	 interact	 and	 therefore	 they	 are	




and	 Schlager	 (2005),	 a	 fundamental	 factor	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 collective	 action	 is	 the	
existence	of	property	 rights.	 	 By	property	 rights	 governments	provide	assurance	 to	users	
that	 their	 access	 to	 the	 resource	 is	 guaranteed	 in	 the	 short	 term	 and	 into	 the	 future.		
Collective	 action	 and	 property	 rights	 are	 strongly	 linked:	 de	 jure	 and	 de	 facto	 property	
rights	 will	 influence	 the	ways	 in	 which	 users	 assert	 claims	 to	 the	 resources	 by	 investing	
collectively	 into	 the	 protection	 of	 ownership	 rights	 (regulating	 access),	 operating	 the	
resource	and	organizing	repair.			
	














the	 right	 to	 membership	 of	 users	 in	 the	 organisation	 as	 well	 as	 excluding	 members,	 to	
contract	 outside	 parties	 for	 those	works	 related	 to	 operation	 and	maintenance	 that	 the	
association	 is	 not	willing	 or	 cannot	 undertake	 and	 to	 access	 support	 services	 (Vermillion	
2001).	
	




from	 the	 state.	 	 Informal	 or	 customary	 rights,	 such	 as	 religious	 rights,	 may	 play	 an	
important	 part	 in	managing	 resources	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 	 For	 example,	women	may	 find	





Collective	 action	 is	 defined	 as	 “action	 taken	 by	 a	 group	 (either	 directly	 or	 on	 its	 behalf	
through	an	organisation)	in	pursuit	of	members	perceived	shared	interest”	(Marshall	1998,	
emphasis	 added).	 	 The	 term	 “shared	 interest”	 implies	 the	 fair	 representation	 or	 the	
participation	 of	 all	 users	 in	 decision-making	 regarding	 resource	 use,	 development	 and	
conservation	 (political	 equality)	 and	 in	 benefiting	 from	 the	 resource	 (livelihoods).		
Collective	action	is	expressed	through	collective	decision-making	about	and	the	practicing	
of	 rules	 of	 using	 (and	 refraining	 from	 use)	 a	 resource,	 monitoring	 use,	 resolution	 of	
disputes	 and	 sanctioning.	 	 The	 actions	 of	 a	 user	 are	 usually	 under	 close	 observation	 by	





The	 need	 for	 collective	 action	 among	 users1	 in	 the	management	 of	 the	 commons	 arises	
from	 certain	 characteristics	 of	 common-pool	 resources.	 	 The	 first	 two	 characteristics	 are	
due	 to	 the	physical	attributes	of	a	given	resource.	 	First,	 it	usually	 is	 too	 large	 to	exclude	
others	 from	 using	 it	 (exclusion).	 	 Second,	 its	 supply	 is	 limited,	 so	 the	 use	 by	 one	 actor	
reduces	 its	 availability	 to	 another	 (subtractability)	 (Tang	 1991;	 Hardin	 1968).	 	 Irrigation	
systems	 are	 perfect	 examples	 of	 a	 common-pool	 resource.	 	 Once	 the	 infrastructure	 is	




users	 to	 solve	 the	 potential	 divergence	 between	 individual	 and	 collective	 rationality”	
(Berkes	et	al.	1998:	p.6).		Collective	action	is	also	needed	when	there	is	multiple	use	of	the	
resource.	 	 Irrigation	 water	 that	 is	 used	 for	 agriculture,	 may	 also	 be	 used	 for	 domestic	
purposes	and	may	also	supply	water	to	livestock	(Meinzen-Dick	and	Knox	1999).		In	terms	
of	 field	 irrigation,	 different	 crops	 require	 different	 amounts	 of	 water	 and	 at	 various	







appropriate	 and	 convey	 water	 and	 to	 make	 and	 rules	 for	 appropriation,	 allocation	 and	
distribution”.	 	 According	 to	 Vermillion	 (2001),	 collective	 action	 in	 irrigation	management	
usually	 takes	 three	 basic	 forms.	 	 The	 first	 is	 constitutional	 action,	 which	 establishes	 the	
organisational	 body	 through	which	 resources	 are	managed.	 	 In	 the	 case	of	 this	 research,	
these	 are	 the	 WUAs	 that	 have	 been	 established	 in	 Central	 Asia	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	
                                                
1	 	 Arguments	 regarding	 the	 inability	 of	 state	 agencies	 to	 effectively	 and	 sustainably	manage	 the	
commons	have	been	established.		The	third	alternative,	the	management	of	the	commons	as	




decentralization	 of	 water	 management	 and	 the	 devolution	 of	 responsibilities	 from	 the	
government	 to	 the	users,	and	 informal	organisations.	 	The	second	 type,	which	Vermillion	
(2001)	 calls	 collective	 choice	 processes	 refers	 to	 rules	 and	 sanctions	 for	 operation	 and	
maintenance	 of	 the	 system	 once	 established.	 	 The	 third	 type	 refers	 to	 its	 operational	
actions	 that	 include	 the	 implementation	 of	 operations,	 maintenance	 and	 dispute	




as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 formal	 establishment	 of	 a	 group	 or	 an	 association.	 	 However,	 while	
collective	 action	 is	 often	 developed	 through	 formal	 channels	 (introduced	 by	 NGOs	 or	
government	agencies),	it	may	also	arise	from	sources	outside	a	formal	organisation,	either	
through	traditional	 institutions	or	spontaneous	cooperation	(Meinzen-Dick	et	al.	2001).	 	 It	
can	 be	 a	 one-time	 event	 or	 recurrent,	 in	 which	 case	 it	 becomes	 institutionalized.		
Institutionalization	of	a	particular	 form	of	 collective	action	 is	 likely	 to	occur,	 if	 it	 is	 in	 the	
recurrent	need	of	a	community	of	users.		
	
Problems	arise	when	cooperation	would	be	 in	the	users	 individual	and	collective	 interest,	
but	 when	 cost	 of	 cooperating	 with	 others	 exceeds	 the	 expected	 benefits.	 	 In	 that	 case	
individuals	are	tempted	not	to	cooperate,	even	if	it	is	clear	to	them,	that	non-cooperation	
will	damage	the	collective	effort.		The	problem	has	been	described	in	the	literature	as	the	




There	 are	 two	main	 lines	 of	 school	 of	 collective	 action.	 	 The	 first	 uses	 institutional	 and	
economic	analysis	of	local-level	collective	action	to	establish	certain	principles	or	conditions	
for	 the	 emergence	 of	 collective	 action	 institutions	 (Ostrom	 1990,	 1992;	 Tang	 1992).		
Mainstream	 institutional	 theory	 follows	the	tradition	of	Thomas	Hobbes	and	Adam	Smith	
for	whom	a	person	 is	a	 rational	 self-interested	 individual	 (Homo	economicus)	and	acts	as	
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such.		Institutional	theory	pictures	institutional	formation	as	a	managerial	activity,	whereby	
“successful”	 institutions	 can	be	 crafted	by	 external	 agencies,	 often	 in	 the	 form	of	 formal	
organisations.	 	 They	 often	 function	 based	 on	 economic	 rationality	 and	 without	 being	
embedded	 in	 the	 local	 context	 (Upton	 2005).	 	 The	 theory	 states	 that,	 under	 certain	
conditions	 users	 of	 a	 resource	 will	 cooperate	 and	 predict	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	
cooperation	 is	most	 likely	 to	 occur	 (Mosse	 1997).	 	 For	 example,	 based	 on	 the	 review	 of	
traditional	community-managed	irrigation	systems,	Tang	(1992)	and	Ostrom	(1992)	observe	
that	 a	 community	may	 successfully	 organize	 in	 those	 areas	 where	 there	 is	 a	 population	
pressure	or	a	limited	supply	of	water	or	both,	where	the	organisation	of	community	labour	
and	management	is	essential	to	gain	access	to	and	share	water,	and	to	minimize	conflicts.		
For	users	 to	get	 together	and	try	 to	 resolve	collective	action	problems,	 they	must	have	a	
strong	 interest	 in	 the	 resource	 (for	 example	 they	 depend	 on	 that	 resource	 for	 their	
livelihoods)	 (Mearns	 1996b)	 and	 mutual	 vulnerability	 defined	 by	 Singleton	 and	 Taylor	
(1992)	 as	 “the	 condition	 of	 a	 group	 of	 actors	 something	 which	 can	 be	 contributed	 or	
withheld	by	others	in	the	group	and	can	therefore	be	used	as	a	sanction	against	the	actor”	
(p.	 315).	 	 Other	 characteristics	 of	 the	 resource	 and	 the	 users	 that	 may	 support	 the	
emergence	of	collective	action	are:	the	presence	of	social	capital,	defined	as	“a	history	of	
cooperation	 and	 networks	 among	 group	 members”;	 a	 community	 with	 negligible	
differences	 in	 socio-economic	 conditions	 and	 in	 divisions	 (that	 would	 prevent	
communication	 among	 users);	 effective	 local	 leadership	 that	 also	 has	 the	 trust	 of	
community	members	(Meinzen-Dick	and	Knox	1999).		
	
The	 second	 school,	 the	 post-institutionalist	 approach,	 focuses	 on	 the	 role	 of	 traditions,	
moral	 codes,	 social	 rights	 and	 value	 systems	 in	 generating	 and	 preserving	 common	
resource	management	 systems.	 	 Its	 line	 of	 thought	 is	 associated	with	 that	 of	 Durkheim,	
according	to	whom	each	person	is	firstly	a	social	being	(Homo	socialogicus)	and	individual	
considerations	 and	 attitudes	 are	 only	 secondary.	 	 The	 post-institutionalist	 approach	





Mosse	(1997)	points	out	that	one	of	 the	most	significant	 limitations	of	 the	 institutionalist	
school	is	the	narrow	and	utilitarian	view	of	institutions	of	collective	action.		He	writes	that	
often	 institutions	 are	 viewed	 as	 entities	 that	 are	 isolated	 from	 larger	 structures	 that,	 in	
reality	surround	them	and	influence	the	way	they	function.		Collective	action	within	those	
communities	is	pictured	as	“narrowly	utilitarian	and	economic,	effecting	the	separation	of	
resource	management	 from	other	aspects	of	 social	 life”	 (p.	470).	 	He	does	not	 reject	 the	
idea	that	common	pool	resource	management	–	where	it	emerged	and	was	maintained	–	
was	 the	 result	of	 individual	 strategy,	but	 suggests	 that,	 in	order	 to	understand	 common-
pool	resource	management	systems,	the	role	of	institutions	in	mediating	individual	strategy	
and	the	social	 relations	behind	them	have	not	been	taken	 into	account	(p.	472).	 	He	says	
that:		
“…attempting	 to	 account	 for	 the	 strengths	 and	weaknesses	 of	 institutions	 of	
resource	management	in	terms	of	the	balance	of	individual	economic	costs	and	
benefits	 gives	 little	 recognition	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 material	 interests	 are	 often	
inseparable	from	social	relationships,	and	that	choices	are	mediated	by	shared	
assumptions	 about	 such	 things	 as	 justice,	 fairness	 and	 reciprocity	 (Douglas,	
1986;	Spencer,	1990:	p.	98)”	(Mosse	1997).		
	
Over	 the	 past	 30	 years,	 theory	 about	 the	 decentralization	 of	 natural	 resource	
management	was	 translated	 into	 practice.	 	 Common-pool	 resource	 theory	 underpinned	
implementation	on	the	ground	and	has	dominated	research.		Saunders	(2014)	argues	that	
the	 outcomes	 of	 these	 projects	 have	 been	 disappointing	 and	 that	 common-pool	 theory	
may	 have	 contributed	 to	 failures.	 	 Central	 to	 his	 thesis	 is	 Elinor	 Ostrom’s	 work	 on	
common-pool	resource	theory	“because	of	its	 iconic	and	influential	status	and	its	explicit	
concern	with	praxis.”	(Saunders	2014:	p.	638).		According	to	Saunders	(2014),	and	echoing	
Mosse	 (1997;	 2003),	 successful	 cooperation	 among	 users	 is	 strongly	 influenced	 by	
interdependencies	 through	 kinship	 and	networks	 rather	 than	 formal	 institutions	 leading	
back	to	arguments	raised	earlier	about	visible	and	 invisible	 institutions	and	their	roles	 in	
water	resources	management.		




within	 a	 network	 and	 range	 of	 institutions	 within	 water	 governance.	 	 They	 are	 able	 to	
solve	problems	by	 themselves	 in	a	context	where	being	embedded	 in	a	complex	web	of	
institutional	arrangements,	including	with	the	government.		
Edelenbos	 and	 van	 Meerkerk	 (2015)	 explore	 the	 role	 of	 trust	 and	 boundary	 spanners	
within	these	networks.		Trust	is	defined	as	“a	stable	positive	expectation	that	actor	A	has	
(or	 predicts	 that	 he	 has)	 of	 the	 intentions	 and	 motives	 of	 Actor	 B	 in	 refraining	 from	
opportunistic	behaviour,	even	if	the	opportunity	arises”	(Edelenbos	and	Klijn	2007).		Trust	
develops	 within	 informal	 networks	 (Folke	 et	 al.	 2005).	 	 According	 to	 the	 authors,	 trust	
plays	an	important	part	within	an	informal	network	(and	outside	the	boundaries	of	formal	
positions)	 providing	 opportunities	 to	 get	 to	 know	 other	 actors’	 drivers,	 interests	 and	




Resolving	 effectively	 complex	 water	 issues	 within	 a	 system	 of	 resource	 management	
requires	effective	 information	 sharing	among	 the	 relevant	 stakeholders.	 	 Edelenbos	and	
van	Meerkerk	(2015)	calls	boundary	spanners	those	who	are	able	to	link	members	of	the	
organization	 that	 they	 represent	 with	 various	 other	 organizations	 operating	 at	 various	
scales	 and	 select	 and	 channel	 information.	 	 These	 members	 must	 be	 willing	 to	
conceptualize	together	issue	and	problems,	seek	solutions	and	exchange	or	pool	together	
resources.	 	Through	 linkage-building,	boundary	spanners	play	an	 important	 role	 in	 trust-
building	 between	 members	 of	 informal	 networks	 and	 those	 acting	 within	 a	 formalized	
structure.	 	 Edelenbos	 and	 van	Meerkerk	 (2015)	 note	 that	 high-trust	 relationships	 could	














As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 collapse	 of	 many	 of	 the	 state	 institutions	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	 an	
institutional	vacuum	was	created	and	most	of	the	management	roles	fell	into	the	hands	of	
local	users.	 	State	water	management	organisations	 that	were	designed	to	service	cotton	
mono-cropping	 collective	 farms,	 are	 unsuited	 to	 deal	 with	 thousands	 of	 small	 farmers	
“growing	 different	 crops	 and	 applying	 different	 agronomic	 and	 water	 management	
practices”	 (Abdullaev	 et	 al.	 2008).	 	 There	 is	 a	 need	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 voluntary	
collective	action	to	 fill	 that	 institutional	vacuum.	 	At	 the	same	time,	due	to	the	history	of	
top-down	 management,	 its	 emergence	 in	 the	 transitional	 context	 poses	 particular	
challenges.	 	 As	 Mearns	 (1996a:	 p.1)	 notes,	 “the	 language	 of	 collective	 action	 is	
unfortunately	 associated	 in	 the	 former	 Soviet	 Union	 with	 the	 failed	 experience	 of	
agricultural	collectivization”.		
	
Communities	of	users	 cannot	be	assumed	 to	exist	universally	or	 to	have	 the	capacity	 to	
create	 sustainable	 resource	 management	 regimes.	 	 In	 those	 communities	 where	 users	
managed	 the	 resource	 for	 less	 than	 one	 generation,	 or	 in	 those	 where	 the	 rights	 and	
responsibilities	 of	 users	 over	 the	 resource	 have	 been	 reduced	 or	 eliminated	 due	 to	
government	 or	 private-sector	 intervention	 in	management,	 collective	 action	 institutions	
may	 have	 weakened	 or	 disappeared	 and	 local	 know-how	 forgotten	 (Meinzen-Dick	 and	
Knox	 1999).	 	 Communities	 in	 post-Socialist	 countries	 experienced	major	 disruption	 and	
discontinuities	 in	 their	 societal	 and	 economic	 organisation.	 	 One	 of	 the	more	 recent	 of	
those	 disruptions	 was	 Soviet-era	 collectivization	 (Mearns	 1996a).	 	 Following	
collectivization	in	the	1930’s,	institutions	within	ex-Soviet	collective	farms	operated	based	
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on	 hierarchical	 relations	 and	 on	 top-down	 decision-making.2	 	 According	 to	 Mearns	
(1996a),	 the	 history	 of	 central	 management	 of	 natural	 resources	 contrasts	 with	 most	
customary	 self-governing	 institutions	 that	 are	 characterized	 by	 bottom-up	 decision-
making,	 trust	 and	 reciprocity	 and	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 commitment	 among	 members.		
Additionally,	while	 in	the	case	of	Soviet	style	management	“strong	 ideological	and	social	
norms”	 were	 imposed,	 in	 the	 latter	 case	 community-adopted	 norms	 guide	 individual	
behaviour	(Mearns	1996a).		Lerman	et	al.	(2002)	explores	the	same	in	the	following	exert,	
pointing	 out	 that	 the	 most	 significant	 difference	 between	 Soviet-	 and	 western-style	
cooperation	is	that	while	the	former	was	force,	the	latter	has	always	been	voluntary:	
“…whether	 identified	 as	 collectives	 or	 cooperatives,	 the	 socialized	 farm	
structures	were	very	 far	 from	the	Western	model	of	a	cooperative:	 the	main	
attribute	 of	 cooperation	 -	 the	 principle	 of	 voluntary	 association	 for	 mutual	
benefit	 -	 was	 abandoned	 during	 Stalin’s	 forced	 collectivization	 campaign	 in	
1929-1930.		Instead,	the	creation	of	all	collective	and	cooperative	farms	in	the	
former	 socialist	 countries	 (both	 before	 and	 after	 World	 War	 II)	 relied	 on	
political	 and	 psychological	 coercion	 and	 was	 often	 associated	 with	





the	worldwide	 trend	 of	 irrigation	water	 transfer	 promoted	 by	 donors	 and	 to	 relieve	 the	
state	of	managing	irrigation	systems,	responsibilities	for	I&D	management	were	handed	to	







                                                






therefore	 have	 not	 been	 sufficiently	 embedded	 in	 the	 communities,	 which	 they	 serve	
(Hassan	et	al.	2004).	In	the	early	years	of	WUA	implementation,	Sehring	(2007)	wrote	that,	
in	 the	 context	of	her	 research,	WUAs	 could	not	be	 seen	as	participatory	mechanisms	 for	












need	 to	 command	 respect	 and	 cooperation	 from	 members.	 	 However,	 old	 elites	 still	
command	 considerable	 influence	 with	 regard	 to	 these	 positions,	 raising	 the	 risk	 of	





only	there	–	 is	a	sobering	one.	Whilst	 it	 is	perhaps	 inevitable	that	the	WUAs	
could	never	meet	all	 the	expectations	made	of	them	at	their	 inception,	their	
general	 lack	 of	 impact	 on	 irrigation	 services	 and	 water	 governance	 is	
indicative	of	deeper,	 structural	weaknesses	 in	water	and	 land	management.	
WUAs	in	Uzbekistan	are,	in	essence,	not	really	water	users	associations	at	all,	
in	that	they	were	created	by	central	government	decree,	permit	only	minimal	





individuals	 and	 are	 able	 to	 create	 or	 strengthen	 collective	 action	 (see	 also	 Chapter	 2,	
Section	 2.5).	 	 The	 “traditional”	 civil	 society	 covers	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 actors	 and	
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organisations	“that	are	a	means	to	an	end:	a	potential	 force	for	positive	change	through	
people’s	 participation	 and	 empowerment.”	 (Giffen	 et	 al.	 no	 date).	 	 The	 alternative	




Giffen	 et	 al.	 (no	 date)	 write	 that	 there	 is	 various	 understanding	 of	 civil	 society	 among	
policy-makers,	 academics	 and	 practitioners	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	 Central	 Asia.	 	 At	 this	
time,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 direction	 development	 has	 taken	 and	 the	 dominant	 policies,	 a	
certain	 model	 of	 civil	 society	 is	 being	 created	 and	 promoted,	 notably	 by	 international	
organisations.	 	 One	 aspect	 of	 this	 is	 the	 promotion	 of	 non-governmental	 organisations	
(NGOs).	 	 Another	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 the	 interactions	 and	 practices	 that	 have	
evolved	in	these	societies	over	time.		
	
According	 to	Olivier	 Roy	 (2002),	 there	 is	 an	 argument	 that	 civil	 society	 does	 not	 exist	 in	
Central	Asia	and	has	to	be	created	is	prevalent	because	“…there	is	nothing	of	value	today	
upon	which	to	build	(the	entire	Soviet	legacy	being	cast	as	negative)	–	or	because	there	is	no	
such	 thing	 as	 a	 traditional	 society	 in	 Central	 Asia,	 owing	 to	 the	 onslaught	 of	 the	 Soviet	
system	on	previous	social	structures.”		Olivier	Roy	(2002)	notes	that	Central	Asian	countries	
are	 endowed	 with	 an	 “immense	 social	 fabric”,	 which	 are	 prevalent	 in	 the	 strong	 social	
networks	running	across	families,	kin,	villages	and	 in	the	form	of	community	 interactions.		
This	 richness	 of	 the	 social	 fabric	 is	 also	 expressed	 through	 pre-Soviet,	 Soviet	 and	
contemporary	institutions.		In	contrast	with	the	“neo-liberal”	approach,	he	describes	what	
Freizer	 (2004)	 terms	 communal	 civil	 society,	 a	 space	 for	 informal	 groups	 and	 group	
activities	 that	are	established	based	on	trust	and	reciprocity	and	are	 frequently	based	on	
kinship	 relations.	 	 It	 does	 not	 address	 state-society	 relations.	 	 Rather	 it	 treats	 relations	
within	 the	 community.	 	 It	 “contains	 repression	 as	 well	 as	 democracy,	 conflict	 as	 well	 as	
cooperation,	vice	as	well	as	virtue”	(Robinson	and	White	1997,	quoted	in	Freizer	2004).		
	
The	 kolkhoz,	 although	 much	 neglected	 in	 the	 development	 literature	 and	 in	 scholarly	
research,	 remains	 a	 “part	 of	 “real”	 society,	 civil	 or	 not”	 and	 its	 memory	 continues	 to	
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represent	 collective	 identities	 (Roy	 1999).	 	 According	 to	 Roy	 (2001),	 during	 the	
collectivization,	 traditional	 solidarity	 groups,	 or	 clans,	 turned	 into	 collective	 brigades	 but	
kept	their	traditional	roles.		During	the	communist	era,	the	Soviet	influence	in	rural	Central	
Asia	was	limited.	 	Many	of	the	leaders	of	the	kolkhoz	were	of	 local	origin.	 	Being	far	from	
the	centre	of	power,	they	functioned	more	as	 local	 leaders,	than	as	apparatchiks.	 	During	




“the	 Central	 Asian	 kolkhoz	 produced	 new	 clans	 and	 tribes,	 as	 patronage	




Upton	 (2005),	who	researched	 institutions	among	Mongolian	herders	after	 the	demise	of	
the	 Soviet	 supported	 collectivized	 agricultural	 sector,	 also	 notes	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
institutional	 elements	 of	 the	 collective	 era.	 	 According	 to	 her	 research	 findings,	 customs	
and	 traditions	 that	 are	 held	 among	 Mongol	 herders	 are	 informed	 by	 the	 various	
experiences	 during	 the	 collective	 period	 and	 an	 “idealized	 precollective	 past”.	 	 Bichsel	
(2006),	 while	 examining	 how	 socially	 embedded	 institutions	 are	 used	 in	 a	 Mercy	 Corps	
project	 in	 Kyrgyzstan	 to	 “increase	 the	 community’s	 sense	 of	 ownership	 towards	 the	
outcome	 of	 the	 project”	 (p.	 108),	 notes	 that	 a	 project	was	 purposefully	 built	 on	 existing	




Due	 to	 the	 resignation	 of	 farmers	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 cannot	 count	 on	 government	
support	for	I&D	management	there	is	evidence	that	socially	embedded	institutions	provide	
services	 that	 government	 institutions	 are	 not	 able	 to	 (Thurman	 2003).	 	 He	 writes	 that	
WUAs	 “are	not	 able	 to	 supervise	 every	 outlet,	 and	 therefore	 the	people	 themselves	must	
help	in	supervision”	(p.	28).		In	particular,	farmers	take	part	in	the	traditional	ashar	(Bichsel	
2006)	and	avandaz,	 the	management	of	water	delivery	 to	 fields	 (Thurman	2003).	 	Ashar,	
which	means	 voluntary	 collective	work	 and	where	 a	 group	 of	 people,	 acquaintances	 and	
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relatives	are	mobilized	to	help	a	household	in	such	activities	as	harvesting	crops	or	building	
a	 house	 is	 an	 institution	 of	 collective	 action	 that	 was	 common	 in	 the	 pre-Soviet	 period.		
Today	it	appears	to	be	in	decline	in	terms	of	inter-household	cooperation,	but	it	resurfaces	
and	 is	 endowed	 with	 new	 meanings,	 such	 as	 community	 self-help	 groups	 in	 the	 larger	
context	 of	 institutional	 transformation.	 	 Another	 traditional	 institution,	 the	 Elders’	 Court	
that	 operates	 based	 on	 traditional	 and	 customary	 law,	 plays	 an	 active	 role	 in	 conflict	
resolution	 (Thurman	 2003;	 Bichsel	 2006).	 Bischel	 (2006)	 writes	 that	 its	 role	 is	 being	
formalized	by	the	State,	which	seeks	to	“introduce	traditional	institutions	with	the	purpose	
of	 nation-building,	 but	 also	 for	 outsourcing	 services	 that	 it	was	 not	willing	 or	 capable	 to	
assume"	(p.	116).	
	
Moss	 and	 Hamidov	 (2016)	 note	 the	 recent	 emergence	 of	 Water	 Users	 Groups	 (WUGs),	
which	 are	 self-initiatives	 organized	 by	 the	 water	 users	 to	 seek	 solutions	 to	 local	 water	
conflicts	organize	rules	for	distribution	and	monitor	water	allocation.		These	groups	emerge	
parallel	 to	WUAs.	 	 They	are	 self-organized	 institutions	 that	 grow	out	of	 former	 collective	
farm	brigades,	extended	families,	or	clans,	etc.	creating	further	evidence	of	the	continued	
persistence	 and	 importance	 of	 informal	 and	 traditional	 institutions.	 	WUGs	 do	 not	 have	
legal	 rights	 or	 representation	 and	 their	 degree	 of	 influence	 and	 power	 within	 the	WUA	
depends	on	the	WUA	Chairman’s	willingness	to	share	power	and	representation.		Although,	





Based	 on	 Moss	 and	 Hamidov’s	 (2016)	 observations	 of	 irrigation	 water	 management	 in	
Uzbekistan,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 WUGs	 resonates	 with	 Lankford	 and	
Hepworth’s	 (2010)	 “bazaar”	 model	 of	 water	 management.	 	 Rather	 than	 a	 “cathedral”	
model	of	hierarchical,	centralised	institutional	framework,	the	“bazaar”	model	allows	the	
co-existence	 of	 a	 network	 of	 decentralised,	 horizontal	 and	 polycentric	 institutions.		
According	 to	 Moss	 and	 Hamidov	 (2016),	 the	 “bazaar”	 model	 is	 especially	 suited	 to	
situations	 characterised	 by	 “little	 reliable	 data,	 fluctual	 water	 supply	 and	 demand	 and	
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under-resourced	 regulatory	 agencies	 –	 all	 factors	 prevalent	 in	 the	 Fergana	 Valley”.	 (see	
also	Chapter	2,	Section	2.5).		
	
This	 research	 adopts	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 that	 builds	 on	 a	 contextual	 and	 dynamic	
understanding	of	 institutions	by	extending	the	definition	of	 institutions	from	formal	rules,	
norms	and	organisations	 to	more	 informal	opaque,	 formally	 embedded	products	of	 their	
political,	 economic,	 cultural,	 social	 and	 religious	 environment.	 	 This	 approach	 seems	
justified,	 given	 the	 richness	 in	 the	 history	 of	 Central-Asian	 institutions	 –	 formal	 and	





To	 understand	 the	 stakes	 that	 farmers	 have	 in	 managing	 their	 resources,	 one	 must	
understand	the	importance	of	irrigation	water	for	livelihoods.		Messer	and	Townsley	(2003)	
define	 households	 as	 "…a	 group	 of	 people	 who	 eat	 from	 a	 common	 pot,	 and	 share	 a	
common	 stake	 in	 perpetuating	 and	 improving	 their	 socioeconomic	 status	 from	 one	
generation	 to	 the	 next."	 	 Livelihoods	 are	 the	 strategies	 that	 households	 use	 to	 make	 a	
living,	to	ensure	food	and	income	and	achieve	relative	well-being.		Livelihoods	include	the	





Messet	 and	 Townsley	 (2003)	 writes	 that	 “institutions	 affect	 the	 different	 livelihoods	 and	











as	 the	 strategies	 that	 are	 suitable	 to	 achieve	 sustainability.	 	 Engagement	 in	 farming	
activities	means	that	the	farmer	would	have	an	interest	in	participating	in	irrigation	water	
management,	while	 someone	who	holds	a	day	 job	would	have	 less	 time	 to	participate	 in	
decision-making	about	distribution	and	maintenance.	
	
Additionally,	 to	 understand	 the	 opportunities	 and	 incentives	 that	 users	 may	 have	 to	
participate	 in	 collective	 action	 and	 their	 powers	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 negotiation	 of	 the	
“rules	 in	use”,	users	cannot	be	conceptualized	merely	according	to	their	productive	roles,	
such	as	 ‘farmers’	or	 ‘irrigators’.	 	 This	 is	because	 these	 terms	do	not	 fully	 and	adequately	
reflect	 the	 social	 identities	 of	 the	 users	 (members	 of	 a	 minority	 group;	 women),	 which	















This	 research	 looks	 into	 issues	 and	 challenges	 related	 to	 irrigation	 water	 use	 and	
management	on	the	local	scale.		The	case	study	approach	was	chosen	as	the	framework	of	
inquiry.	 	 In	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 case	 study	 approach,	 the	 inquiry	was	 built	 through	 a	
literature	 review	 that	 explores	 historical	 and	 contemporary	 rural,	 agricultural	 and	
irrigation	 issues	 in	general	and	 in	 the	Central	Asian	context.	 	During	a	 three-month	 long	
fieldwork,	 information	was	 gathered	 first	 hand	 through	 interviews	 (open-ended	 and	 in-
depth)	 with	 farmer	members	 of	WUA,	 with	 officials	 of	 government	 irrigation	 agencies,	
with	 representatives	 of	 informal	 organisations	 and	 through	 participant	 observation.	 	 In	
this	 chapter,	 the	 framework	and	 the	methods	used	 in	 the	 research	and	 their	 limitations	
are	presented.		The	research	location	is	introduced	and	considerations	that	influenced	the	






and	 contextual	 contemporary	 phenomena	 over	 which	 the	 researcher	 has	 little	 or	 no	
control.		Moreover,	in	documenting	and	writing	a	case	study,	the	researcher	may	rely	on	
multiple	 sources	 of	 evidence,	 based	 on	 various	 methods	 of	 collecting	 information	
(literature	 review,	 observation,	 various	 interviewing	 methods),	 he	 writes.	 	 While	
conventional	 opinions	 judge	 the	 case	 study	 method	 unsuitable,	 because,	 among	 other	
criticisms,	the	context	is	uncontrollable,	giving	too	much	scope	for	interpretations	by	the	
researcher	 thereby	 making	 it	 unsuitable	 for	 rigorous	 scientific	 inquiry,	 Flyvbjerg	 (2006)	





of	 study	provides	 an	opportunity	 for	 concrete	 experiences,	 for	 feedback	 and	avoids	 the	
“academic	blind	alleys,	where	the	effect	and	usefulness	of	research	becomes	unclear	and	
untested”	(p.	223).	 	By	the	following	citation	of	Campbell	 (1975,	cited	 in	Flyvbjerg	2006),	
he	indicates	the	necessity	of	making	research	into	human	behaviour	context	specific	and	
the	inherent	bias	in	any	such	research:	
“After	 all,	 man	 is,	 in	 his	 ordinary	 way,	 a	 very	 competent	 knower,	 and	
qualitative	common-sense	knowing	is	not	replaced	by	quantitative	knowing.	.	.	
This	is	not	to	say	that	such	common	sense	naturalistic	observation	is	objective,	
dependable,	 or	 unbiased.	 But	 it	 is	 all	 that	 we	 have.	 It	 is	 the	 only	 route	 to	
knowledge—	noisy,	fallible,	and	biased	though	it	be.	(pp.	179,	191)”	
	
Baxter	 and	 Eyles	 (1997)	 express	 concerns	 over	 “rigor”	 in	 qualitative	 research	 where	 a	
researcher	 is	 faced	with	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 “creativity	 of	 the	 qualitative	 research	
process	–	which	implies	contingent	methods	to	capture	the	richness	of	context	dependent	
sites	 and	 situations	 –	 and	 evaluation	 –	 which	 implies	 standardized	 procedures	 and	
methods	of	reporting”	(p.	505).		They	recognize	that	the	“characteristics”	of	the	researcher	
in	interpreting	the	findings	is	gaining	increasing	importance	in	qualitative	research.		They	
suggest	 that	 the	 reflectivity	 of	 the	 researcher	 in	 terms	 of	 explicitly	 acknowledging	 the	
research	processes	(fieldwork,	data	analysis	and	interpretation)	and	their	limitations	is	an	
important	 tool	 in	 making	 research	 “rigorous”	 (valid,	 reliable	 and	 objective,	 responsible	
and	honest).		
	
The	 literature	 review	 was	 based	 on	 past	 and	 current	 academic	 work	 on	 irrigation	
decentralization.	 	Through	networking	with	fellow	researchers,	 I	 tried	to	 incorporate	the	
results	of	the	most	recent	research	in	the	literature	review	and	identify	issues	that	needed	








the	 region	where	 I	wished	 to	study	 irrigation	practices.	 	 Staying	 in	 the	 research	 location	
and	 living	with	 a	 farmer	 family	 allowed	me	 to	 be	 present	 at	 all	 times	 creating	 suitable	





learning	 about	 the	 livelihoods,	 the	 culture	 and	 the	 religion	 was	 very	 valuable	 in	
understanding	people’s	behaviour	towards	each	other	when	it	came	to	sharing	resources.		
Being	 present,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 profit	 from	 chance	 encounters	 (which	 allowed	 for	 casual	
conversations,	in-depth,	open-ended	interviews	and	transect	walks	to	collect	information	
for	 case	 studies).	 	 I	 studied	 irrigation	 practices	 by	 participating	 in	 the	 daily	 activities	 of	
farmers	and	from	my	point	of	view,	this	was	the	only	strategy	by	which	I	could	gain	a	deep	
insight	 into	 the	 culture	 and	 livelihoods	 that	 otherwise	 (through,	 for	 example,	 random	
visits)	 would	 have	 remained	 unknown	 to	me.	 	 Once	 I	 became	 known,	 I	 was	 invited	 to	
lifecycle	 celebrations,	 to	 marriages	 and	 to	 an	 endless	 number	 of	 teas,	 that	 helped	
establish	friendships,	respect	and	trust	between	the	users	and	I.	
	
My	 participation	 throughout	 the	 fieldwork	 varied	 between	 moderate	 and	 active	
participation	 (DeWalt	 and	 DeWalt	 2002).	 	 DeWalt	 and	 DeWalt	 (2002)	 describe	 active	
participation	as	a	situation	when	the	researcher	engages	 in	the	community’s	activities	 in	
order	to	 learn	about	rules	of	behaviour,	while	 in	the	case	of	moderate	participation,	the	
researcher	 is	 present	 in	 the	 communities	 and	 identified	 as	 a	 researcher,	 but	 instead	 of	
actively	participating,	he/she	acts	as	an	observer	who	only	occasionally	interacts	with	the	
people.	 	 My	 research	 was	 overt	 (Whyte	 1984),	 meaning	 that	 people	 around	 me	 were	
aware	of	my	interest	and	purpose,	an	awareness	which	in	some	cases	certainly	biased	the	
research	by	 influencing	 farmer’s	behaviour	 towards	me.	 	On	 the	other	hand,	choosing	a	




Interviews	with	water	 users	 and	with	 officials	were	 central	 to	 this	 research.	 	 Of	 the	 41	




• irrigation	 water	 users.	 Their	 source	 of	 irrigation	 water	 is	 the	 Dzsijde-Munduz	
canal;	





at	 the	head	and	tail	ends	along	 the	canal),	 the	survey	population	 included	 farmers	 from	
both	the	head	and	tail	ends.		
	
The	 research	was	 conducted	during	 the	 irrigation	 season	and	 farmers	were	 approached	
during	 transect	 walks	 while	 making	 field	 observations.	 	 The	 timing	 provided	 an	
opportunity	to	observe	irrigation	practices	and	irrigation	issues	that	were	on	the	minds	of	
people	 and	 were	 frequently	 subject	 of	 conversations.	 	 Approaching	 farmers	 during	
transect	walks	required	opportunity	sampling,	or	on	the	spot	decisions	about	sampling,	as	
well	 as	 informal	 conversational	 interviews	 (one-on-one)	 and	 informal	 group	 interviews.		
This	sampling	technique	is	well	suited	for	direct	observation,	because	 it	offers	maximum	
flexibility	 to	 pursue	 information.	 	 It	 also	 allows	 for	 expanding	 on	 information	 gathered	
previously	 and	 building	 on	 interviews	 already	 completed.	 	 For	 more	 in-depth	
understanding	of	how	certain	institutions	function,	I	made	use	of	methods	that	are	usually	
classified	under	purposive	sampling	(or	judgment	sampling).		Based	on	earlier	interviews	I	
selected	 information	 rich	 cases	 for	 in-depth,	 unstructured	 interviews	 (Patton	 2001).		
Interviews	with	representatives	of	local-level	bureaucratic	organisations	were	undertaken	
through	 direct	 contact	 and	 snowball	 sampling,	 or	 “identifying	 cases	 of	 interest	 from	
sampling	 people	 who	 know	 people	 who	 know	 people	 who	 know	 what	 cases	 are	
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My	 interpreter	 also	 acted	 as	 my	 main	 informant.	 	 He,	 as	 a	 well-known	 and	 respected	
member	 of	 the	 community	 and	 a	 part-time	 farmer	 himself,	 ensured	 my	 access	 to	 the	
communities	of	users.	 	He	taught	me	much	about	the	culture,	about	how	to	respectfully	
present	 myself	 in	 front	 of	 farmers	 in	 the	 traditional	 and	 Muslim	 communities	 that	 I	
studied;	 about	 farming	 and	 irrigation	 problems,	 and	 offered	 precisions	 regarding	
geographic,	 historic,	 cultural	 and	 religious	 issues.	 	 My	 interview	 strategy	 consisted	 of	
interviewing	a	large	number	of	farmers,	most	of	them	only	once.		Being	very	busy	and	in	
the	 midst	 of	 the	 irrigation	 season,	 they	 seemed	 to	 be,	 except	 for	 a	 few	 examples,	
reluctant	to	meet	me	more	than	once.		While	the	first	meeting	does	not	usually	allow	for	
“building	rapport”	and	results	mostly	in	normative	statements	(Whyte	1984),	I	found	that	




particularities	of	 doing	 research	 in	post-Soviet	 countries,	 Kandiyoti	 (1999)	questions	 the	
suitability	and	usefulness	of	 surveys	and	closed-ended	questions	as	 they	provide	 limited	
freedom	to	uncover	the	subtleties	of	various	concepts,	and	therefore	the	opportunities	to	
gain	 in-depth	 understanding	 of	 the	 context.	 	 In	 the	 case	 of	 open-ended	questionnaires,	





A	 list	of	questions	 that	 I	used	as	a	guide	 for	 the	 interviews	 is	presented	 in	Annex	A.	 	To	
measure	the	performance	of	collective	action,	the	study	explores	institutions	and	gives	a	
description	 of	 their	 characteristics	 (participation	 in	 making	 rules,	 collective	 decision-
making,	observing	rules	and	putting	them	in	practice	collectively,	sanctioning).		Therefore,	
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the	majority	 of	 the	 questions	 focuses	 on	whether	 or	 not	 users	 employ	 institutions	 and	
participate	in	various	organisations	or	spontaneous	cooperation	to	access	and	manage	the	
I&D	 system	 and	 how	 those	 institutions	 function.	 	 Some	 questions	 focused	 on	 the	
characteristics	 of	 users	 and	 their	 households,	 including	 their	 livelihood	 activities	 and	
socio-economic	 characteristics.	 	 Questions	 pertinent	 to	 user	 water	 needs	 and	
endowments,	 including	 alternative	 water	 sources,	 were	 also	 included.	 	 The	 degree	 to	
which	 individuals	 and	 households	 rely	 on	 irrigation	water	 and	 to	which	 the	 resource	 is	
available	to	them	(from	irrigation	canals	or	from	other	sources)	helps	estimate	the	stakes	
and	 incentives	 that	 users	 have	 in	 institution	 building.	 	 The	 socio-economic	 data	 help	
determine	which	strata	of	the	population	(based	on	wealth,	gender,	religion	and	ethnicity)	




ended	 questions	 (and	 some	 closed	 ended	 questions),	 were	 changed	 and	 finalized	 after	
getting	 to	 know	 the	 communities	 and	 having	 completed	 the	 first	 few	 interviews.	 	 The	
initial	 questionnaire	 was	 quite	 broad,	 covering	 issues	 related	 to	 all	 three	 types	 of	
landholdings,	 such	 as	 shareholders	 land	 (ülüs),	 kitchen	 gardens	 (tamorka)	 and	
government-owned	lands	(arenda).	 	After	the	first	 interviews	I	realized	that	covering	the	
issues	 related	to	 the	management	of	 the	 three	 types	of	 landholdings	brought	out	broad	
and	complex	issues,	to	which	I	could	not	have	done	justice	over	a	three-month	long	field	
research	period.	 	 I	 therefore	decided	 to	 focus	mainly	on	ülüs	 lands,	as	 they	 seemed	 the	
most	 significant	 in	 terms	 of	 livelihoods	 and	 of	 the	 change	 from	 collective	 to	 individual	













































to	 convey	 and	 support	 arguments	 that	 were	 present	 in	 other	 interviews	 but	 not	 so	








ranges	 between	 500	 and	 750	 mm,	 much	 of	 which	 falls	 between	 October	 and	 April	
(AQUASTAT).	 	The	 soil	 is	siernozem	 in	 complex	with	alluvial	 soils.	 	 The	vegetation	 in	 the	













reservoir’s	 territory	 lies	 in	 Kyrgyz	 territory,	 the	 reservoir’s	 outlets	 are	 controlled	 by	
Uzbekistan,	which	gives	five	percent	of	the	total	amount	of	water	stored	by	the	reservoir	
to	Kyrgyzstan.5		The	actual	amount	fluctuates	according	to	the	amount	of	water	available	








brunch	off	 the	KDO.	 	One	 such	 canal	 is	 the	Zsijde-Mazar	 canal.	 	 It	 delivers	water	 to	 the	





are	 predominantly	 agricultural.	 	 As	 the	 area	 is	 populous,	 there	 are	 high	 pressures	 on	
limited	land	resources,	notably	in	Kyrgyzstan	where	agriculture	employs	53%	of	the	labour	
force.	 	 Agriculture	 overwhelmingly	 relies	 on	 irrigation	 and	 some	 45%	 of	 the	 irrigation	
areas	 of	 the	 Syr-Darya	 basin	 are	 located	 in	 the	 valley.	 	 Due	 to	 the	 importance	 of	
agriculture	to	the	economy,	people	depend	a	great	deal	on	seasonal	climate	and	weather	
conditions	for	adequate	amounts	of	water	for	irrigation.		In	addition	to	water	availability,	
access	 to	 water,	 water	 quality,	 rising	 groundwater	 and	 waterlogging	 are	 the	 main	
problems	 that	 the	 area	 is	 dealing	 with	 (UNEP	 2005).	 	 The	 border	 regions	 between	


















This	 research	 concerns	 itself	 with	 irrigation	 water	 management	 in	 two	 of	 the	 villages	
situated	 along	 the	 Zsijde-Mazar	 canal:	 Zsijde	 and	Munduz	 (Figure	 1).	 	 Both	 villages	 are	
located	 close	 to	 the	 border	 with	 Uzbekistan	 and	 depend	 on	 seasonal	 water	 allocation	
determined	by	the	climate	and	agreements	between	Kyrgyzstan	and	Uzbekistan.	 	Of	 the	
two	villages,	Zsijde	is	located	closer	to	head	of	the	irrigation	system.		In	2005,	607	families	
(3	226	persons)	 lived	 in	 the	 village.	 	 The	number	of	hectare	of	 land	 that	belongs	 to	 the	
villagers	 is	 728.	 	 Of	 that,	 78	 hectares	 are	 ogorods,	 where	 people	 grow	 grain,	 corn	 and	
vegetables.		Beside	the	ogorods,	people	have	access	to	ülüs	and	arenda	lands.		Munduz	is	
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situated	 further	downstream	 from	Zsijde	along	 the	 canal.	 	 In	2005,	365	 families	 lived	 in	
Munduz	and	 its	population	was	1	685.	 	The	total	area	of	agricultural	 land	owned	by	the	
families	is	389	hectares.	 	Of	that,	68	hectares	are	ogorod	 lands,	248,71	hectares	are	ülüs	




During	 fieldwork,	 I	 mainly	 to	 observe	 irrigation	 water	 management	 by	 farmers.	 	 As	 the	
employees	of	the	WUA	were	mostly	absent	from	the	field,	there	is	a	risk	that	I	focused	too	
much	 on	 the	 farmer’s	 practices	 and	 perspectives	 and	 too	 little	 on	 those	 of	 the	





My	 data	 about	 irrigation	 water	 availability	 and	 issues	 regarding	 management	 is	 mainly	
based	on	interviews	and	discussions	with	water	users	and	thus	reflect	the	perception	of	the	








community	 and	 individuals	 in	 certain	 endeavours.	 	 That	 impression,	 I	 learnt	 later,	was	 a	
legacy	of	 international	aid	organisations	 in	the	era,	which,	upon	visiting	the	communities,	
brought	money	 and	 projects.	 	 Nor	was	my	 participation	 as	 a	 researcher	 neutral.	 	 Rapley	
(2004)	 writes	 that	 there	 is	 in	 fact	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 neutrality	 in	 an	 interviewee	 and	
interviewer	relationship.		Interviewing	is	inherently	biased	through	the	overarching	control	
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of	 the	 interviewers	 “through	 questions,	 silence	 and	 responses	 tokens	 (e.g.	 ‘okay’)	 and	
chiefly	 they	 decide	 which	 particular	 part	 of	 the	 answer	 to	 follow	 up”	 (Watson	 and	
Weinberg	1982	cited	in	Clive	et	al.	2004).	As	a	woman,	I	was	not	completely	free	in	moving	
around.	 	Many	 farmers	 guarded	 their	 water	 at	 night	 as	 freeriding	 occurred	 then.	 	 I	 was	





and	 ignorance	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	 language.	 	 Although	 with	 time	 my	 Russian	 language	 skills	
improved	 greatly,	 I	 had	 to	 rely	 on	 an	 interpreter	 whenever	 I	 wanted	 to	 engage	 in	
conversations	 with	 the	 users	 and	 other	 members	 of	 the	 community.	 	 I	 designed	 the	
questionnaire	 in	 English	 and	 the	 interpreter	 translated	 it	 during	 the	 interviews.	 	 Farmers	
responded	 in	Russian	and	 the	 interpreter	 translated	 the	 responses	 into	English.	 	Working	
with	 an	 interpreter	 paused	 certain	 limitations.	 It	 certainly	 paused	 the	 challenge	 of	




Conducting	 the	 fieldwork	 during	 the	 irrigation	 season,	 although	 beneficial	 from	 certain	
perspectives	that	 I	mentioned	earlier,	also	created	certain	 limitations.	 	Farmers	tended	to	











In	 this	 chapter,	 first	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 landscape	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	







The	 Ferghana	 valley	 has	 been	 an	 important	 centre	 of	 irrigated	 agriculture	 since	 ancient	
times.	 	 Irrigation	 in	 the	 valley	 has	 been	 a	 crucial	 determinant	 not	 only	 for	 economic	
development	 but	 also	 in	 shaping	 the	 culture	 and	 politics	 of	 the	 region.	 	 Irrigated	
agriculture	dates	back	as	far	as	the	second	century	BC.		The	era	preceding	collectivization	





Kokand	 Khanate	 established	 in	 1709.	 	 The	 Khanate	 upgraded	 irrigation	 infrastructure	
along	major	urban	centres	primarily	but	also	opened	up	new	lands	in	the	southeast	of	the	
valley	 settling	 previously	 nomad	 populations	 (Bichsel	 2009).	 	 The	 nineteenth-century	
Russian	administrator	and	scholar	Aleksandr	Fedorovich	Middendorf	writes	about	this	era	
that:		
“[…]	 over	 thousands	 of	 years	 the	 populace	 had	 constructed	 huge	 water	
channels,	 carried	 out	 large-scale	 fertilization	 and	 planted	 whole	 forests	 of	




gardens	 included	 melons,	 water	 melons,	 cucumbers,	 pumpkins,	 grapes,	
apricots,	 peaches,	 apples,	 pears,	 quinces,	 nuts,	 plums,	 cherries,	 not	 to	
mention	onions,	carrots,	beets	and	other	produce.	 	The	main	grain	crop	was	
wheat,	 which	 Kirghiz	 cattle	 ranchers	 raised	 on	 the	 lower	 slopes	 of	 the	 Alai	
range	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 side	 business.	 […].	 	 The	 expansion	 of	 irrigation	 after	 the	
early	 eighteenth	 century	 increased	 the	 number	 of	 villages	 and	 reduced	 the	
area	available	 for	grazing.	 	 Cotton	growing	always	had	held	a	 special	 place	










From	1917,	the	Soviet	 leadership	transformed	Central	Asia.	 	 It	divided	existing	territorial	
units	integrating	them	into	new	republics	and	bringing	them	under	one	political	union.		It	
reorganized	 the	 population	 of	 the	 valley	 along	 major	 groups	 –	 the	 Uzbeks,	 Tajiks	 and	
Kyrgyz	in	the	Ferghana	Valley.		While	beforehand	the	inhabitants	may	have	subscribed	to	
various	 identities,	 the	 ethnic	 identities	 that	 Soviet	 officials	 determined	 at	 this	 time	
became	 official	 ethnicities	 and,	 later	 on,	 nationalities.	 	 Political	 and	 societal	
transformation	occurred	alongside	the	reorganisation	of	the	economy,	the	collectivization	








dry	 and	 dry	 areas	 (O’Hara	 2000).	 	 The	 Soviet	 Union,	 transformed	 agriculture	 by	
collectivization	 and	 forming	 collective	 farms	 (Russ.	 kolkhoz)	 and	 state	 farms	 (Russ.	
sovkhoz).		Both	the	shovkoz	and	the	kolkhoz	were	subordinate	to	the	state.		The	irrigation	




managed	 –	 operated	 and	 maintained	 by	 a	 hierarchical	 administration	 with	 the	 Soviet	
Ministry	of	Land	Reclamation	and	Water	Resources	 (minvodkoz)	at	 the	highest	 level	and	




On	 independence	 in	 1991,	 Kyrgyzstan	undertook	 several	 reforms	 in	 the	 agricultural	 and	
irrigation	sectors.		A	new	Land	Code	was	adopted	in	1999,	which	allows	state,	communal	
and	 individual	 ownership	 of	 land	 (Lindberg	 no	 date).	 	 The	 Land	 Redistribution	 Fund,	
administered	 first	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Land	 and	 Water	 Resources	 and	 later	 by	 village	
governments,	 set	 aside	 25	 percent	 of	 the	 kolkhoz	 and	 shovkoz	 lands	 to	 the	 state	 and	
redistributed	 the	 remaining	 75	 percent	 to	 previous	 members	 of	 the	 collective	 or	 state	
farms.		The	amount	of	land	that	was	distributed	to	individuals	depended	on	the	number	of	
people	 living	 in	 a	 village,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 farm	 and	 the	 number	 of	 years	 an	 individual	
worked	on	a	collective	farm.		Initially	the	new	farms	were	medium	sized,	but,	by	2004,	due	
to	 orientation	 in	 agriculture	 towards	 small-scale	 farming,	 the	 large	 number	 of	 peasant	
farms	 emerged,	 accounting	 for	 nearly	 the	 quarter	 of	 the	 country’s	 agricultural	 lands.		
Between	1992	and	2002,	 the	number	of	peasant	 farms	 increased	 from	4	100	 to	84	700	
(Spoor	 2004).	 	 The	 size	 of	 landholdings	 varies	 between	 one	 hectare/person	 to	 0.1	





hence	 administrative	 regions)	 and	 the	 diversification	 of	 crops,	 the	 three	 countries	 that	
occupy	the	valley	now	have	to	cope	with	sharing	the	water	across	border	and	allocating	
water	 in	country	among	myriads	of	small	producers	and	subsistence	 farmers.	 	However,	




satisfying	 growing	 demands.	 	 An	 irrigation	 management	 system	 that	 was	 designed	 to	
deliver	 water	 to	 monocropping,	 cotton-growing	 collective	 farms	 must	 now	 satisfy	 the	
needs	of	hundreds	of	 individual	 farmers	with	the	freedom	to	cultivate	the	crops	of	their	
choice.	 	 Thurman	 (2003)	writes	 that	 the	 I&D	 infrastructure	 that	 the	 newly	 independent	
states	inherited	was	already	in	a	poor	condition	during	the	late	years	of	the	Soviet	Union.		
Since	 independence,	due	to	the	reduction	 in	state	 funding	“to	almost	nothing”	 (Johnson	
III,	Stoutjesdijk	and	Djailobayev	2002)	and	to	the	lack	of	capacity	of	the	farmers	to	invest	













Collectivization	meant	 the	eradication	of	 traditional	 forms	of	 farming.	 	While	 the	Tsarist	
system	 integrated	 traditional	 institutions	 and	 organisations	 in	 its	 own	 system	 (Bischel	
2006),	the	Soviet	administration	believed	that	full	productivity	could	not	be	achieved	until	
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the	 inhabitants	of	Central	Asia	had	dropped	 their	old	 traditions	and	adopted	new	ones7	
(Wheeler	1955).		Therefore,	the	Soviet	administration	took	water	management	“out	of	the	
hands	 of	 traditional	 elders	 and	 councils	 with	 whom	 it	 resided”	 (O’Hara	 2000:	 p.430),	





always	 of	men	 and	 from	 the	 older	 generation.	 	 The	most	 significant	 role	 of	 the	 Elders’	
Council	 was	 dispute	 resolution	 within	 and	 between	 communities.	 	 They	 are	 also	
authorized	to	represent	the	interest	and	speak	for	the	community.	 	Ashar	 is	a	traditional	
form	 of	 cooperation	 where	 “groups	 of	 people	 are	 mobilized	 to	 assist	 construction	 and	
maintenance	 tasks	of	a	 collectivity”	 (Bischel	2006:	p.108).	 	 It	 lost	 its	 voluntary	 character	
when	 it	 became	 obligatory	 collective	 labour	 (Russ.	 subbotnik)	 under	 the	 Soviet	










maintaining	 a	 specific	 irrigation	 system	 so	 as	 to	 provide	 the	 owners	 and	 users	 of	
agricultural	 land	 with	 irrigation	 water”	 (Law	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	 Republic	 on	 Unions	
(Associations)	of	Water	Users	#38:	2002).	 	 The	 tasks	of	 the	WUA	are	 the	operation	and	
maintenance	 (rehabilitation	and	 improvement)	of	 the	 irrigation	 infrastructure	and	water	
                                                
7	According	to	Wheeler	(1955)	this	notion	is	an	essential	feature	of	Marxism,	“but	it	has	particular	
force	 when	 applied	 to	 a	 people	 whose	 culture	 is	 largely	 Islamic,	 for	 the	 Russians	 believe	 that	
Islam	is	far	less	compatible	with	modern	methods	than	Christendom”.	
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Other	 rights	 are	 the	 right	 to	mobilize	 financial	 resources	 in	 the	 form	 of	 water	 fees	 (or	







WUA,	but	only	on	 the	condition	 that	 they	hold	a	 lease	 the	 length	of	which	 is	more	 that	









members	 are	 ensured	 “faire	 and	 equitable	 distribution	 of	 irrigation	 water”	 as	 well	 as	
environmental	 security	 (Law	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	 Republic	 on	 Unions	 (Associations)	 of	 Water	
Users	 #38:	 2002).	 	 In	 addition,	 through	membership	 in	 the	WUA,	 farmers	may	 gain	 the	
following	benefits:		













farming,	on	which	most	of	 the	habitants	 rely	 to	some	degree	 for	 their	 livelihoods,	 is	only	










poverty.	 	 The	 southern	 regions	 of	 Kyrgyzstan,	 including	 the	 research	 location	 has	 the	
highest	density	of	 rural	population.	 	Due	 to	 the	economic	downturn	and	 the	collapse	of	
the	 industrial	 sector	 since	 independence,	 poverty	 has	 grown	 significantly,	 especially	 in	
rural	areas.		According	to	the	country’s	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	(Government	of	
the	 Kyrgyz	 Republic	 2002),	 in	 2001,	 51	 percent	 of	 the	 population	 was	 considered	 poor	
and,	of	that,	15,6	percent	extremely	poor.		
	
Rural	 households8	 adjusted	 to	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 changes	 that	 accompanied	
independence	by	diversifying	their	 livelihoods	activities.	 	 In	addition	to	 jobs	 in	the	public	
sector,	business,	economic	migration	has	become	an	important	contributor	to	household	
                                                
8 According to Kandiyoti (1999), the definition of a household must always be adjusted to local 
circumstances.  In the case, household includes various generations - parents, children, including 
married, daughter-in-laws and grandchildren living together in the same household. Girls, when they 
get married, move to their husband’s family.  While girls leave the parental household, boys, usually 
the youngest, looks after the parents in their old age.  Daughter-in-laws may also contribute to the 






for	wedding	 and	 only	 a	 part	 of	 the	 remittances	 is	 contributed	 to	 household	 spendings.		
Laruelle	(2007)	writes	that	of	the	300	000	migrants	that	the	Kyrgyz	government	officially	




complement	 income-generating	 activities.	 	 Much	 of	 what	 is	 grown	 is	 used	 within	 the	
household	as	safety	net.		For	example,	despite	the	low	market	value	of	the	cotton,	almost	
everyone	 in	 my	 sample	 cultivates	 some.	 	 Cotton	 is	 not	 only	 a	 cash	 crop	 but	 also	 a	
subsistence	 crop.	 	 It	 is	used	 for	oil,	 for	 carpet-making	and	provides	material	 for	heating	
and	cooking.		Rice,	due	to	its	high	value	in	the	market,	constitutes	a	safety	net	for	families:	





on	 collective	 farms.	 	 The	 state	 no	 longer	 determines	 how	much	 of	 each	 crop	 a	 farmer	
should	or	must	grow	nor	does	 the	WUA	advise	 farmers	 regarding	 the	choice	of	crops	 in	











Figure 4 Diversity in crops in Zsijde 
 
Source:  Author’s interviews (2008). 
 
 






head	 of	 household	 is	 responsible	 for	 looking	 after	 water	 and	 for	 constructing	 canals	












Diversity in crops in Zsijde
Series1 11 10 7 5 2 3













Diversity in crops in Munduz
Series1 2 18 8 14 10 5
Sunflower Rice Cotton Grain Corn Other 
	 50	
Shirin	 cooperative	 farm	 located	 within	 the	 research	 area,	 where	 women	 organize	 the	
irrigation	of	1.5	hectares	of	rice.	 	Widows	and	their	sons	also	organize	irrigation	on	their	
lands.	 	 As	 the	 children	 grow	 up,	 they	 receive	 responsibilities	 for	 certain	 jobs	 in	 the	












Nizamendinkhodjayeva	 (no	 date)	 looked	 into	 the	 importance	 of	 irrigation	 water	 for	
livelihoods	in	the	rural	regions	of	Kyrgyzstan,	Uzbekistan	and	Tajikistan.		According	to	her,	
access	 to	 irrigation	water	 is	 an	 essential	 resource	 to	meet	 the	 subsistence	 needs	 of	 the	
rural	 population,	 in	 particular	 of	 the	 rural	 poor.	 	 	 Irrigation	water	 is	 an	 essential	 input	 in	
activities	 such	 as	 crop	 growing,	 poultry	 farming	 and	 livestock	 rearing.	 	 Due	 to	 increasing	
poverty,	there	has	been	a	change	in	agricultural	production	to	food	crops,	leading	to	higher	
water	 demands	 (Wegerich	 2001).	 	 Other	 important	 but	 non-farming	 livelihood	 activities,	
such	as	brick-making,	box-making,	baking	and	selling	bread	indirectly	depend	on	access	to	






The	contribution	 irrigated	agriculture	makes	 to	 the	household	economy	depends	on	 the	
amount	of	 land	 the	households	have	access	 to.	 	Access	 is	 in	 the	 form	of	ownership	and	
	 51	
rent.		The	size	of	the	lands	that	people	received	was	determined	based	on	the	amount	of	
land	 available	 in	 a	 certain	 area	 and	 on	 the	 density	 of	 the	 population.	 	 In	 Zsijde	 and	
Munduz,	 each	 habitant	 received	 14	 sotiks	 of	 land.	 	 These	 rather	 small	 sections	 of	
smallholders’	lands	(Kyrg.	ülüs)	are	usually	pooled	together	by	the	extended	family,	which	
means	 that	 each	 family	 in	 Zsijde	 and	Munduz	owns	 approximately	 one	hectare	of	 land.		








The	 government	 also	 set	 aside	 25	 percent	 of	 the	 ex-kolkhoz	 and	 ex-shovkhoz	 lands	 as	
arenda	 land.		In	addition,	each	family	owns	a	small	kitchen	garden	that	is	usually	located	
next	 to	 the	 house	 and	where	 vegetables	 are	 grown	 and	 fruit	 trees	 are	 found.	 	 Various	
modes	 of	 farming	 are	 practiced,	 including	 individual	 peasant	 farms,	 family	 farms,	







and	location	of	the	 land.	 	The	perception	among	farmers	whom	I	 interviewed	is	that	 land	
redistribution	 in	 1996	 was	 fair;	 most	 people	 were	 informed	 of	 their	 rights	 and	
responsibilities	and	they	all	received	equal	amounts	of	lands.		However,	it	is	clear	from	the	
interviews	 that	 some,	 who	 were	 better	 informed	 about	 the	 process,	 claimed	 lands	 for	
themselves	 and	 their	 relatives	 earlier	 than	 most	 farmers	 could	 and	 were	 also	 able	 to	
choose	the	location	of	their	land.		This	was	the	case	with	an	interviewee,	who,	when	asked	
about	the	land	redistribution,	said	that	he	received	15	hectares	of	ülüs	land	for	himself	(his	
family)	 and	 his	 relatives	 in	 1995.	 	 Having	 known	 about	 the	 shortage	 of	 water,	 he	 chose	
lands	that	are	 located	near	the	canal.	 	He	then	divided	the	 land	among	his	relatives.	 	 It	 is	
	 52	
most	 likely	 that	 inequalities	were	 facilitated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 changes	 from	 the	 collective	
system	to	individual	 land	ownership	took	years	to	complete,	giving	occasion	for	obtaining	





extent,	 an	 oblast-level	 irrigation	 official,	 both	 gained	 privileges	 during	 the	 land	
redistribution	 that	 established	 their	 superior	 position	 vis-à-vis	 other	 farmers	 in	 terms	 of	








In	any	 irrigation	system,	parallel	 to	 the	physical	network,	a	network	of	social	actors	plays	
the	management	 role.	 	 This	 social	 network	 includes	everyone	 from	 those	 that	divide	 the	
water	at	the	head	of	the	system	to	the	field	level	users.		Along	the	Zsijde-Munduz	canal,	the	
Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA	manages	the	irrigation	water	and	the	associated	infrastructure.		Within	
its	 territory,	 a	 number	 of	 informal	 institutions	 also	 play	 a	 part	 in	 irrigation	 water	
management.		In	this	section	of	the	study,	I	discuss	the	structure,	rules	and	activities	of	the	
Bek	 Abad	 Suu	 Water	 Users	 Association	 (“Bek	 Abad	 Suu	 WUA”),	 the	 only	 formal	
organisation	that	is	responsible	for	irrigation	water	management	in	the	research	territory.		
Next,	 I	 explore	 those	 institutions	 that	 are	 informal	 in	 nature	 as	 well	 as	 those	 that	 are	
spontaneous	 and	 look	 at	 what	 roles	 they	 fill	 in	 the	 management	 of	 irrigation	 water.		







Suu	WUA.	 	 In	1959,	 the	 two	kolkhoz	 united	 to	 form	 the	Erkin	 kolkhoz,	 the	 total	 area	of	
which	was	 4	 006	 hectares	 and	 its	 irrigated	 area	 1	 826	 hectares.	 The	 population	 of	 the	
kolkhoz	 was	 8	 000	 and	 the	members	 of	 the	 farm	 numbered	 3	 500.	 	 The	 kolkhoz	 grew	
cotton,	 tobacco,	 potatoes,	 vegetables,	 grain	 and	 corn.	 	 Production	 and	 cultivation	 was	
organised	 in	 19	 brigades,	 of	 which	 15	 were	 responsible	 for	 cotton	 cultivation	 and	 four	
looked	after	livestock.9			
	
The	present	 irrigation	 system	was	built	during	kolkhoz	 times.	 	 In	1951	and	52,	hydraulic	
work	was	carried	out	on	the	Kara	Darya	River,	to	regulate	the	flow	of	the	river	and	reduce	
the	 chances	 of	 flood.	 	 The	 lined	 canals	 were	 built	 in	 1964.	 	 In	 1959,	 the	 first	 water	
association	 was	 formed	 in	 Bek-Abad,	 made	 up	 of	 water	 specialists	 that	 planned	 and	
executed	water	 distribution.	 	Murabs	 of	 Erkin,	 Zsijde	 and	Munduz	 divided	 the	water	 to	
each	village.10	
	
In	1996,	during	the	midst	of	 the	restructuring	of	 the	agricultural	sector,	 the	kolkhoz	and	
the	shovkoz	were	both	abolished	and	the	agricultural	 lands	 that	once	belonged	to	 them	
were	redistributed	to	individual	farmers.		The	redistribution	created	three	land	categories:	
ülüs	 lands	were	 given	 to	 everyone	 (including	 children)	 alive	 at	 that	 time	 and	 live	 in	 the	
village.	 	 The	 size	 of	 the	 ülüs	 was	 determined	 based	 on	 the	 amount	 of	 arable	 land	 and	
population	numbers	in	each	village.	The	farmers	kept	the	ogorod	lands	that	are	attached	





neighbouring	WUAs	 is	shown	on	Map	2.	 	The	area	of	 the	WUA	covers	3	260	hectares,	2	



















There	 are	 two	 committees	within	 the	 association:	 the	 Revision	 Committee	 (or	 Revision	
Commission)	 and	 the	 Conflict	 Committee	 (or	 Dispute	 Resolution	 Commission).	 	 The	
Revision	 Committee	 consists	 of	 three	 members	 elected	 at	 the	 meeting	 of	 WUA	
representative	 assembly	 for	 three	 years.	 	 The	 Revision	 Committee	 is	 responsible	 for	
inspection	of	accounting	records,	assets,	material	&	technical	reserves	and	bank	accounts	







that	 activities	 of	 the	 WUA	 should	 be	 based	 on	 such	 principles	 as	 participative	






the	organisational	 structure	of	 the	WUA	provides	 for	 the	participation	of	 farmers	 in	 the	
decision-making	 processes.	 	 The	 WUA	 Specialist	 of	 the	 OblVodKhoz	 described	 the	
organisational	structure	as	follows:	
	
They	 organisation	 adopted	 a	 new	 organisational	 structure	 based	 on	 the	
experience	 of	 the	 World	 Bank.	 	 The	 organisational	 structure	 has	 changed	
from	 an	 up	 to	 down	 to	 a	 bottom-up	 structure.	 	 Before,	 one	 person,	 the	
Chairman	of	the	kolkhoz,	made	the	decisions.		The	farmers,	at	the	bottom	of	
the	 structure,	 acted	 according	 to	 the	 decisions	 by	 the	Chairman.	 	Now	 the	
decisions	 are	made	 collectively.	 	On	 the	 top	of	 the	 structure	 is	 the	general	
meeting	 (farmers),	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Council	 and	 on	 the	 bottom	 is	 the	
technical	 team.	 	 The	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Council	 (seven	members)	 are	 tasked	
with	 collecting	 water	 fees,	 selecting	 the	 arbitration	 committee	 and	 also	
controlling	 the	services	provided	by	the	technical	 staff.	 	The	technical	 team	
undertakes	maintenance.12	









WUA	 and,	 by	 law,	 each	 member	 of	 the	 family,	 under	 whose	 name	 a	 piece	 of	 land	 is	
registered	 is	 also	 its	 member.13	 	 In	 exchange	 for	 payments,	 in	 money	 or	 in	 kind,	 from	
farmers,	 the	 WUA	 distributes	 water	 and	 maintains	 the	 infrastructure.	 	 The	 WUA’s	
responsibility	 consists	 also	 of	 acquiring	water	 from	 the	 supplier	 (a	 government	 agency)	
and	managing	water	distribution	along	 the	 Zsijde-Mazar	distributary	 canal	 and	between	
                                                
13	According	to	the	Law	of	the	Kyrgyz	Republic	“on	Unions	(Associations)	of	Water	Users”,	“Physical	
or	legal	entity	that	owns	a	plot	of	agricultural	land	situated	within	the	Service	area	of	a	WUA	or	





networks	 of	 tertiary	 canals.	 	 It	 is	 also	 responsible	 for	 repair	 and	 maintenance	 on	 the	







The	 accuracy,	 timeliness	 and	 effectiveness	 depends	 on	 the	 availability	 of	 water,	 the	
demand	of	 various	users,	 the	 capacities	of	 the	 canals	 and	 the	 capacity	 to	measure	 flow	
and	 distribute	water	 according	 to	 the	 demand	 of	 the	 users	 and	 on	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	
operators.	 	 For	 an	 irrigation	 system	 to	 work	 efficiently,	 two	 things	 are	 needed:	
functioning,	 accurate	 and	 reliable	 physical	 structures	 in	 which	 gate	 settings	 can	 be	
adjusted;	and	a	team	of	well-trained	operators	(Bosch	et	al.	1993).	
	






The	allocation	of	water	 in	the	field	runs	 into	difficulties.	 	Due	to	the	dilapidated	state	of	
the	 infrastructure	 except	 perhaps	 for	 the	 conveyance	 system,	 also	 called	 headworks	




difficult	at	best,	but	mostly	 impossible.	 	When	asked	about	 the	division	of	water	among	








incorporated	 in	 the	 new	 institutional	 framework.	 	 The	 position	 carries	 with	 it	
responsibilities	 such	 as	 the	 scheduling	 and	 distribution	 of	 water	 among	 the	 aryks	 and	
collecting	 water	 duty.	 	 The	 murab	 is	 the	 employee	 of	 the	 WUAs	 and	 is	 therefore	
answerable	 to	 the	WUA	management	 and	 the	 users.	 	 The	murab	 is	 in	 contact	with	 the	
farmers	each	day	and	is	aware	of	the	water	needs	of	the	community	that	he	is	responsible	




number	of	 farms	that	the	WUA	is	responsible	 for,	 the	 limited	means	of	 the	organisation	
and	the	problems	with	the	infrastructure,	close	and	effective	control	over	distribution	on	
the	level	of	the	farmers	 is	 impossible.	 	Additionally,	the	murab	receives	very	 little	salary.		
The	 position	 frequently	 changes	 hands16	 and	 is	 periodically	 left	 vacant,	 as	 was	 the	
situation	in	Munduz	at	the	time	of	the	research.	 	Finding	a	murab	 is	further	complicated	
















needs	 of	 the	 users.	 	 Infrastructure	 is	 lacking	 intake	 structures	 and	 gates	 to	 be	 able	 to	
control	water	 flow.	 	There	are	 technological	 lacks	 to	measure	water	 levels	and	calculate	
water	 flow	 at	 various	 points	 of	 the	 canals.	 	 From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 institutions	 and	
organizations,	 the	 WUA	 is	 lacking	 competent	 operators	 who	 are	 able	 to	 monitor	
distribution,	the	duration	of	 irrigation	by	 individual	 farmers	and	hold	the	authority	vis-a-
vis	the	users	to	settle	any	breach.		
	
The	majority	 of	 interviewees	 reported	 seasonal	 irrigation	water	 shortages.	 	 Seven	 of	 the	
eight	farmers	who	do	not	experience	water	shortages	are	upstream	farmers	(i.e.	closest	to	
the	head	of	 the	canal).	 	Among	the	 interviewees,	27,	who	were	the	most	affected	by	the	
periodic	 water	 shortages,	 lived	 downstream	 (their	 farms	 were	 located	 in	 a	 considerable	
distance	 from	 the	 head	 of	 the	 irrigation	 system).	 	 Therefore,	 the	 geographic	 location	 of	
each	land	in	the	irrigation	system	determined	whether	farmers	would	have	sufficient	water	
or	 not.	 	 This	 situation	 is	 also	 played	out	 on	 the	 larger-scale.	 	While	 Zsijde	 is	 seen	 as	 not	
having	 a	 water	 problem	 (despite	 the	 fact	 some,	 especially	 downstream,	 do	 experience	
water	 shortages)	 Mangut,	 a	 street	 located	 between	 Zsijde,	 Munduz	 and	 Hodjo-Muskui	
(another	 sector	 of	 Zsijde	 that	 is	 situated	downstream	 relative	 to	 Zsijde)	 all	 do.	 	 An	 Elder	







fluctuations	 in	 the	 climate	 and	 to	 a	 dilapidated	 irrigation	 infrastructure.	 	 Cold	winters	 in	






The	 representative	 of	 the	 Bek	 Abad	 Suu	WUA	 confirmed	 that	 in	 2008,	 one	 third	 of	 the	
amount	of	irrigation	water	was	available	compared	to	other	years.19		Due	to	the	dilapidated	
irrigation	infrastructure,	there	is	also	much	loss	of	water	in	the	system.		Officially,	about	20	




On	 the	 demand	 side,	 some	 interlocutors,	 farmers	 as	 well	 as	 professionals,	 are	 of	 the	
opinion	that	the	increased	cultivation	of	rice	in	the	area	is	causing	water	shortages.		Since	
the	introduction	of	rice	cultivation	on	350	hectares	in	199020,	cultivation	expanded	to	490	






that	 they	grow	a	number	of	hectares	of	 rice	but,	 in	reality,	 they	will	plant	
more.		In	the	whole	Suzak	there	is	1	700	hectares	of	rice,	but	in	reality	there	





as	much	 as	 corn.	 	While	 these	 latter	 crops	 require	 irrigation	 several	 times	 per	 year,	 rice	
needs	 to	 be	 cultivated	 in	water,	 and	 cannot	 survive	 extended	 periods	without	 irrigation.		







when	asked,	 the	Chief	murab	 said	 that	 the	 reason	 for	water	 shortage	 is	 the	bad	 state	of	
tastructure,	he	did	admit	that	the	rice-growing	was	the	cause	of	periodic	bottlenecks:	











 The	 inefficiencies	 of	 the	 physical	 infrastructure	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 management	 and	
supervision	by	the	murab	below	the	level	of	the	aryk	and	on	the	level	of	individual	farmer	
create	 a	 situation	 where	 quarrels	 and	 fights	 over	 water	 are	 frequent	 and	 free-riding	
frequently	occurs.	 	 I	observed	many	 times	users	 standing	guard	at	 the	abstraction	point	
(the	 point	 where	water	 can	 be	 taken	 from	 the	 canal)	 in	 Zsijde	 (for	Munduz	 and	 Hodjo	
Muskui)	and	manipulating	the	flow	of	the	water	with	a	stone.	 	There	are	arguments	and	
usually	the	older	or	stronger	wins.		An	interviewee	demonstrated	how,	in	order	to	water	
his	 land,	 he	 makes	 holes	 in	 the	 lined	 canal	 to	 be	 able	 to	 abstract	 water	 at	 night.	 	 In	






any	 disputes.	 	 These	 are	aksakals,	 one	 from	each	 village.	 	 If	 they	 are	 not	 available,	 the	
                                                
22	Author’s	interview	with	the	Chief	murab	in	May,	2008.		
	 62	
chief	 of	 the	 WUA	 becomes	 the	 decision-maker.23	 	 Punishment	 is	 given	 for	 damaging	
infrastructure	 such	 as	 breaking	 the	 canals	 or	 making	 holes	 in	 their	 walls.	 	 Those	 who	





Disputes	 over	 water	 and	 breaches	 are	 hardy	 ever	 reported	 to	 the	 WUA.	 	 One	 of	 the	




somebody	 takes	 it	without	my	permission.	 	The	water	 is	a	 common.	 	All	of	
them	may	use	the	water.”26	
	
The	 above	 quotation	 highlights	 the	 issues	 around	 the	 definitions	 of	 water	 rights	 and	
access.	 	While	 for	 the	WUA	 leaders,	 rights	of	access	are	associated	with	membership	 in	
and	 payments	 for	 water,	 for	 the	 users	 the	 right	 to	 access	 irrigation	 water	 is	 strongly	
associated	with	land	rights	but	it	is	dissociated	from	being	a	member	of	the	WUA.		In	fact,	
most	 farmers	 believe	 that	 water	 is	 a	 free	 and	 common	 resource.	 	 The	 following	
conversation	demonstrates	well	this	attitude:	
Who	has	 the	 right	 to	use	 irrigation	water?	 	 Everybody	has	 the	 right	 to	use	
irrigation	water.	 	Even	those	who	do	not	pay?	 	Yes.	 	You	see	the	use	of	the	
water	is	free	of	charge.		The	people	will	pay	money	for	the	WUA	to	repair	the	






canals.	 […]	 	 In	the	Kyrgyz	 law	it	 is	said	that	water	 is	 free.	 	For	example,	this	
year	I	may	not	pay	the	money	for	water,	because	there	were	no	repairs.27	
	
A	 similar	 situation	 arises	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 arbitration	 committee	 and	 the	 WUAs	
punishment	mechanisms.	 	 Interviewees	were	not	aware	of	them	and	they	tended	not	to	
report	problems	regarding	stealing	and	free-riding	to	the	WUA.		If	there	was	an	attempt	to	
resolve	a	dispute,	users	preferred	 to	do	so	between	 themselves	and	 to	save	 face.	 	They	
relied	on	such	social	sanctions	as	shaming	rather	than	turning	to	formal	institutions	such	
as	the	arbitration	committee.		In	the	words	of	the	Chief	murab:	













canals	 and	 the	 farmers’	 fields.	 	 The	 vacuum	 is	 filled	 with	 informal	 institutions	 and	
spontaneous	 cooperation	 that	mostly	 arise	 in	 response	 to	 water	 scarcity.	 	 Examples	 of	










supervision.	 	 The	 situation	 of	 the	 farmers	 of	 Hodzso-Muskui,	 a	 part	 of	 Zsijde,	 is	 a	 good	
example	of	 such	 informal	 collective	action.	 	Hodzso-Muskui,	 competes	with	Munduz	 for	
water.	 	As	a	result	of	water	shortages,	farmers	show	more	willingness	than	other	groups	















Ashar	has	been	an	 institution	of	collective	action	 for	 long	a	 long	 time.	 	 It	 is	a	pre-Soviet	
Central	Asian	custom,	probably	of	Uzbek	origin,	and	the	Kyrgyz	strongly	identify	with	it.		In	
the	 framework	 of	 the	 ashar,	 community	members	 are	 called	 together	 to	 build	 houses,	
harvest	 crops	 and	 undertake	 charity	 work	 (helping	 widows	 for	 example).	 	 During	 the	
Soviet	period,	paid	work	replaced	ashar	 in	 the	 fields.	 	Nonetheless,	people	continued	to	
practice	the	custom	outside	the	kolkhoz,	mainly	in	houses	construction.		In	some	cases,	in	
the	Soviet	era	kolkhoz,	workers	were	required	to	work	on	the	repair	and	maintenance	of	
the	 canal.	 	 Participation	 was	 paid	 and	 it	 was	 obligatory:	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 kolkhoz	
punished	whoever	did	not	participate	in	the	ashar30.		
	





Both	 the	 concrete	 canal	 and	 the	 field-	 level	 canals	 are	 repaired	 using	ashar.	 	 The	WUA	
maintains	 the	 concrete	 canal.	 	 The	 head	 of	 the	 local	 government	 and	 the	 Chair	 of	 the	
association	determine	what	 repairs	will	 take	place,	where	and	when.	 	 To	undertake	 the	




especially	 since	 independence.	 	Firstly,	while	pre-Soviet	ashar	was	organized	 to	 support	
families,	 there	 is	 a	 decrease	 in	 family-oriented	ashar	 today.	 	 Instead,	 people,	 or	 rather	
families,	 who	 need	 work	 done,	 hire	 workers	 to	 do	 those	 tasks	 that	 used	 to	 be	
accomplished	 communally.	 	 Secondly,	 people	 today	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 provide	 their	 time	
and	 labour	 for	others	 free.	 	 Interviewees	explained	this	change	to	me	as	 follows:	 	Ashar	
used	 to	 be	 (during	 the	 Soviet	 era)	 a	 way	 of	 life	 in	 which	 “everybody	 would	 help	
everybody”32,	(meaning	that	the	whole	village	was	invited).		Today,	however,	the	circle	of	
those	 to	 be	 invited	 to	 participate	 in	 an	 ashar	 is	 limited	 to	 those	 that	 one	 has	 good	
relations	with.		People	invite	relatives,	friends	and	neighbours	for	building	houses	and	for	
harvests.	 	 Some	 interviewees	 attributed	 this	 to	 the	 fact	 that	people	 are	 richer	now	and	




Earle	 et	 al.	 (no	 date)	 writes	 that	 while	 community	 assistance	 for	 single	 families	 is	
becoming	 rare,	 ‘communal’	 ashar,	 in	 which	 the	 whole	 community	 comes	 together	 to	
undertake	 the	 construction	 or	 repair	 of	 communal	 infrastructure	 is	 becoming	 more	
common.		Nowhere	this	is	more	apparent	than	in	irrigation.		In	each	of	the	communities	
that	 I	studied,	ashar	 is	used	to	clean	and	repair	the	aryks	each	spring,	 in	preparation	for	
the	growing	season.		During	Soviet	times,	the	kolkhoz	would	pay	workers	(the	members	of	
brigades)	to	repair	the	canals.	 	Farmers,	frequently	ex-members	of	the	kolkhoz,	continue	




to	 undertake	 this	work,	 free	 of	 charge,	 since	 the	 government	 (through	 the	kolkhoz)	 no	
longer	provides	payment	for	the	work.		
	
Interviewees	 agreed	 that	 the	 impetus	 to	 call	 an	 ashar	 is	 not	 a	 collective	 decision	 of	 a	
community	of	the	users.		Rather,	the	leading	members	of	the	community,	the	ail	baschi	or	
the	aksakals	will	mobilize	people	 for	 the	ashar	 and	 it	 is	 their	 responsibility	 to	distribute	
the	work	among	the	farmers.	 	While	 it	 isn’t	communally	generated,	people	regard	ashar	






In	 1991,	 the	 newly	 independent	 Kyrgyzstan	 inherited	 from	 the	 past	 an	 irrigation	
infrastructure	 that	 had	 fallen	 into	 despair,	 limited	 financial	 means	 and	 professional	
capabilities	and	a	hierarchical	governance	system	in	irrigation	that	no	longer	matched	the	
needs	of	 the	millions	of	 small	 landowners.	 	The	development	path	 that	 the	government	
set	 out	 on	 was	 guided	 by	 international	 policy	 discourse	 and	 donors	 saw	 the	
decentralization	 of	 irrigation	 management	 and	 the	 devolution	 of	 responsibilities	 for	




for	 the	management	of	 the	 irrigation	 system.	 	 Introduced	based	on	a	generic	model	 for	
WUAs,	it	has	a	set	organizational	structure,	clearly	defined	rules	and	responsibilities	and	a	
membership	 that	 is	made	 up	 of	 the	water	 users	 in	 the	 research	 area.	 	 The	WUA	 holds	
distribution	rights,	 rights	 to	collect	 fees	 for	water	delivery,	 to	settle	disputes	and	to	 fine	
free	riders.		Success	in	fulfilling	the	responsibilities	of	the	WUA	means	providing	water	on	
time	and	in	sufficient	quantities	over	a	period	of	time	and	at	a	reasonable	cost	(from	the	
perspective	of	 the	farmer).	 	 IMT	also	 implies	assuming	responsibility	 for	management	of	
the	 infrastructure,	 including	 operation	 and	 maintenance,	 and	 the	 participation	 of	 the	
irrigators,	specifically	in	cooperating	in	tertiary	and	on-farm	irrigation	and	supporting	the	
Bek	 Abad	 Suu	WUA	 in	 repair	 and	maintenance.	 	 Here	 collective	 action	 by	 the	 users	 is	
essential.		
	
The	 findings	 of	 the	 study	 reveal	 that	 the	 Bek	 Abad	 Suu	WUA	 is	 unable	 to	 successfully	
manage	 supply	 and	 distribution.	 	 A	 good	 example	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 accurate	 data	 on	 the	
number	of	hectares	of	rice	and	other	crops	do	not	exist,	making	it	impossible	for	the	WUA	




repair	of	which	the	WUA	cannot	 fund	-	 the	water	 fee	collected	 from	members	does	not	








water	 rights	 and	 regulations	 regarding	 fines	 and	 punishment.	 	 The	 cause	 may	 be	 that,	
during	 Soviet	 time	 there	 was	 very	 little	 opportunity	 for	 decision-making	 within	 the	
prevailing	institutional	and	organisational	frameworks.		It	may	also	be	that,	farmers	do	not	
have	an	incentive	to	participate	in	the	work	of	the	WUA	as	they	feel	that	the	WUA,	due	to	
lack	 of	 resources	 is	 unable	 to	 fulfil	 its	 responsibility	 towards	 them:	 to	 provide	 a	 timely,	
equitable	as	sufficient	water.		
	
The	 factors	 that	 influence	 the	emergence	of	 collective	action	are	numerous.	 	Among	 the	
most	important	are	factors	are	the	strong	interest	in	the	resource,	mutual	vulnerability,	the	
presence	of	social	capital,	negligible	differences	in	socio-economic	conditions	and	effective	
local	 leadership	 that	 also	 have	 the	 trust	 of	 community	members.	 	 In	 the	 research	 area,	
collective	 action	 by	 the	members	 of	 the	WUA	 is	 lacking.	 	 Farmers	 lack	 understanding	 of	
their	 new	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	 vis-à-vis	 the	 WUA	 and	 a	 wish	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	
management	of	irrigation	water	through	the	new	institutional	structure	that	is	provided	for	
them.	 	 Rather,	 they	 mutually	 experience	 a	 water	 scarcity	 and	 need	 to	 acquire	 water.		




Much	time	has	passed	since	 the	 fieldwork	 for	 this	 research	and	there	are	numerous	new	
questions	 arising	 about	 irrigation	 institutions	 in	 the	 Syr	 Darya	 River	 basin.	 	 While	 this	
research	 found	 evidence	 of	 informal	 groups	 of	 farmers	 acting	 together	 to	 defend	 their	
interest,	 Moss	 and	 Hamidov	 (2016)	 observes	 the	 emergence	 of	 more	 organised	 WUGs.		
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One	 line	 of	 enquiry	 worthwhile	 pursuing	 is	 the	 evolution	 of	 WUAs	 in	 the	 irrigated	
agriculture	 landscape	of	 the	Ferghana	Valley.	 	Another	question	 is	whether	 the	groups	of	
users,	 informally	 organized	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 research,	 have	 further	 evolved	 into	more	
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Do	 you	 participate	 in	 decision-making	 about	 irrigation	 water	 distribution?
	 Why?/Why	not?	
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Do	you	participate	voluntarily	or	are	you	obliged	to	do	so?	 	 	 	



























Researcher:			 	Blanka	 Füleki,	 Graduate	 Student,	 Département	 de	 Géographie,	
Université	de	Montréal	
Director:		 	Thora	 Martina	 Herrmann,	 Professor	 Adjoint,	 Département	 de	
Géographie,	Université	de	Montréal	






the	 importance	 of	 irrigated	water	 to	 local	 livelihoods	 in	 the	 research	 area,	 (2)	 describe	
formal	 and	 informal	 institutions	 through	 which	 farmers	 manage	 irrigation	 &	 drainage	
systems,	 and	 (3)	 determine	 which	 characteristics	 of	 the	 institutions	 support	 collective	
action	and	which	characteristics	inhibit	its	development.	
	
Your	participation	 in	 this	 research	will	consist	of	 responding	to	certain	questions	




community	water	management	 in	 transitional	 countries.	 	 	 This	project	and	 the	methods	
chosen	to	collect	data	does	not	result	in	any	inconvenience	and	benefit	to	you.		
	
Please	 be	 aware	 that	 your	 participation	 is	 entirely	 voluntary.	 You	 are	 under	 no	
obligation	 to	answer	any	of	 the	 following	questions,	and	may	request	 to	withdraw	from	
our	study	at	any	point	without	explaining	your	withdrawal.		If	you	wish	to	withdraw	from	
the	research	or	wish	to	report	a	complaint	related	to	the	research,	you	may	contact	the	




benefit	 to	 you	 and	 the	 only	 inconvenience	 is	 the	 time	 required	 for	 the	 interview	 (an	




and	only	 the	 researcher	will	have	a	 list	 containing	 the	name	of	 the	participants	and	 the	








I	 declare	 that	 I	 am	 aware	 of	 the	 contents	 of	 the	 Consent	 Form,	 that	 I	 received	
satisfactory	responses	to	my	questions	about	my	participation	 in	the	research	and	that	 I	









Name	 in	 print	 (First	 Name/Family	 Name):	 	 _________________________________	
_________	
I	declare	that	I	explained	to	the	participant	the	goal	of	the	research,	the	nature	of	
his/her	 participation	 as	 well	 as	 the	 advantages	 and	 the	 risks	 related	 to	 his/her	
participation	 in	 the	 research.	 	 I	 answered	 to	 his/her	 questions	 to	 the	 best	 of	 my	
knowledge.	
		







the	 Université	 de	 Montréal,	 at	 1	 (514)	 343-2100,	 or	 by	 writing	 to	
ombudsman@umontreal.ca	(The	ombudsman	accepts	collect	calls).	
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